Supply chain security has become a top priority for the shipping industry in the fight against terrorism. One important question that we are currently examining is how to seal a freight container to ensure that it is not interfered with along the way. Among the possibilities are electronic seals and technological innovations that could help to identify what is in a container and who has opened it, when and where.
Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, this kind of technology was seen mostly as a way of reducing labor costs in ports. Since 9/11, however, the aim has become to use new technology to enhance security.
As technology is being developed, there still remain open questions as to what the specific goals are, what is required by whom and when. While the general aim is to prevent unauthorized access to containers, we have to remember that containers do not ship weapons of mass destruction - people do.
Therefore we have to look at the very beginning of the supply chain. No matter how secure we make the container, we shall not in the end prevent a terrorist act if the person originally loading the cargo has evil intent. On the contrary, if we do not secure the initial loading process but do secure the container, we are securing the weapon of mass destruction on its intended course.
This means that governments must assist in the effort through intelligence gathering. There is also an onus on officials to establish that the shipper and the consignee are secure individuals. Companies can help, but they do not have the intelligence capabilities and the resources available to governments.
If the original source of the cargo can be checked with a reasonable degree of certainty, it becomes a little easier to secure a container through the supply chain. It can be done fairly quickly with current mechanical technology, for example through the use of numbered bolt seals. In future such seals could perhaps contain a simple electronic chip that could be read at interchange points.
In ports that do not have the necessary electronic infrastructure, you can still have somebody tug on the seal, record the number and make sure it is correct. In ports that have the electronic capability, the seal can tell a handler when prompted, "Yes, I'm okay, I'm intact, and I'm still using the same number." We ought to be able to develop some such gadget fairly quickly.
Robert Ahlborn is Director of Security and Dangerous Goods at Hapag-Lloyd (America), Inc.
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