In the eyes of many Europeans the U.S. decision to use military force against
Iraq without the support of some of its major allies has posed a serious threat
to the international security institutions established following World War II.
In the aftermath of the war in Iraq, Europeans must find a way of persuading the
United States that institutions such as the United Nations and NATO are the right
places to address its future security concerns.
This was one of the main themes to emerge from a conference in Athens on Europe
and the new U.S. National Security Strategy, organized on the eve of the war by
the Greek Government, which currently holds the Presidency of the European Union,
and the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU).1
More than 250 European national parliamentarians, government representatives and
security experts attended the conference. The great majority of speakers showed
understanding for the strong emotions felt by Americans following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, but they also expressed concern over certain aspects
of U.S. security policies and statements recently made by leading U.S. policy-makers
about Iraq.
The war in Iraq was seen as the first implementation of President George Bush’s
controversial National Security Strategy, published in September 2002. The comprehensive
strategy is an impressive statement of U.S. determination to defend America from
its enemies, and particularly against threats posed by international terrorist
networks such as Al Qaeda and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).
The Strategy also proposes dealing with the root causes of terrorism through diplomatic
initiatives, economic aid and special support, with a particular focus on moderate
Muslim countries.
Many speakers at the conference, however, were critical of what they described
as the new Strategy’s unilateral approach and its legitimization of what
appeared to be an unlimited right of intervention for the United States. This,
together with Washington’s initiation of hostilities in Iraq, was widely
seen as putting the survival of the international security institutions at risk.
Although many members of international organizations for political consultation
and decision-making, such as the United Nations, NATO and the European Union,
had doubts about the seriousness of the threat from Iraq, the United States acted
on the basis of its own assessment that the threat was serious enough to justify
military intervention.
Theodoros Pangalos, a former Greek Foreign Minister, said it was important for
the international community to agree on a number of points: who should lead any
joint action in the event of a WMD threat from a state or a terrorist group, how
decisions to act should be made and who should make them, and who should implement
such decisions.
Mr. Pangalos argued that in the absence of such an agreement, there was a risk
that the United States would impose its own form of multilateralism, meaning that
it would bypass international institutions and seek a coalition of nations willing
to support what would in practice be a unilateralist policy.
Lluis Maria de Puig, a Spanish Socialist Member of Parliament said that the strategy
document called for the United States to retain its existing military supremacy
over other nations and to regard the threat posed by WMD as serious enough to
trigger preemptive, unilateral action. He added that the use of religious language
by President Bush and the impression given by him that America had a special mission
to rid the world of evil had caused particular dismay among Europeans. Such thinking
was especially dangerous if the mission was not so much for the United States
to lead its allies and partners as to dominate them, he said.
While many speakers criticized the content of the Security Strategy and the way
it had been presented and implemented, Ivan Eland, Director of the Center for
Peace and Liberty of the Independent Institute2 in Oakland, California, also cast
doubt on its viability and potential for success. In his view, the two central
tenets of the strategy – primacy and preemption – were both counterproductive
and unsustainable. The strategy was already proving counter-productive, in that
it was accelerating the proliferation of WMD rather than slowing it down, he asserted.
Mr. Eland cited North Korea and Iran as examples of countries that were already
stepping up their efforts to acquire WMD, so as to be able to threaten retaliation
if the United States were to consider intervening in their regions. The U.S. strategy
was unsustainable, he argued, because it would be too costly – and in any
case it was virtually impossible to intervene in every country working on nuclear,
biological or chemical weapons programs.
Like other participants in the conference, however, I share the view that after
the war against Iraq, there will be an historic chance to establish the basis
for a democratic government and the rule of law in that country.
As for NATO, William Hopkinson of the Royal Institute for International Affairs
in London predicted that the consequences of the new U.S. strategy would be limited
as the Alliance was already “dying.” In his view, the recent American
trend toward unilateralism and the dynamics of ever greater military superiority
would mean that in the long term no other nation would be capable of operating
alongside U.S. military forces. This would merely reinforce a process at the end
of which NATO would no longer be relevant for U.S. security policy.
If the outlook for NATO appears somewhat grim, participants were not much more
optimistic about the European Union’s attempts to establish a common European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Anatol Lieven of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Washington said that the United States had long been ambiguous
toward European efforts to develop a more independent security and defense policy.
Under the current administration, that ambiguity might turn into open hostility.
Nevertheless, while it is true that many leading members of the U.S. administration
are profoundly skeptical about the seriousness of Europe’s efforts to increase
its military capabilities, we should not be too pessimistic. I am convinced that
if Europeans were to spend their limited resources in a better and more efficient
way, and with a view to creating capabilities complementary to those of the United
States, they could once again become viable partners.
Europe can provide the United States with permanent military bases in a stable
mainland environment, under conditions that are far more attractive to U.S. forces
than remote islands in the middle of the ocean. The United States has every reason
to continue to cooperate with its traditional NATO allies as part of its national
security and defense policy. One of those allies is Turkey, which has a vital
role to play in Europe’s security and defense, despite the recent difficulties
between Washington and Ankara over Iraq.
Europe will be an important partner for the United States in its security dialogue
with the former Soviet Union countries, not only because of its geographical proximity,
but also because of its extensive trade and financial links with Russia. As Vladimir
Lukin, Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma, rightly pointed out, it is in everyone’s
interests to maintain the anti-terrorist and anti-proliferation coalition, which
already includes a number of countries that did not have a clean arms proliferation
record in the past.
We have to accept that for the foreseeable future the United States will be very
reluctant to allow any multinational body to inßuence the use it makes of its
military forces. But Washington might be willing to cooperate and coordinate if
there were somebody or something to cooperate and coordinate with. One area in
which this might be possible, despite the fact that Europe prematurely declined
U.S. offers of cooperation, is missile defense, where there is huge potential
for a joint security effort.
What Europe is endeavoring to do in the Balkans is a first step in the right direction,
with the European Union preparing to take over NATO’s peacekeeping missions
not only in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia but perhaps also in Bosnia.
If Europe shows that it is willing and able to share the burden of guaranteeing
international peace and security, it will gain credibility as a respectable partner
in the eyes of the United States. Europe, which has no ambition to establish a
competitive autonomous security and defense system on a par with the United States,
needs to concentrate on improving its military capabilities by making more efficient
use of its financial resources.
Then, if the United States acknowledges Europe’s political will and recognizes
that its improved military capabilities make it possible for Europeans to join
America in shaping a safer world and fighting international terrorism, there is
a good chance that confidence will quickly be restored on both sides of the Atlantic.
Without the Americans, Europeans cannot achieve their ambitions in the Balkans
or safeguard their global security interests. There is no credible European military
presence in East Asia or the Pacific, as Mr. Lieven pointed out.
There is, however, a fundamental need for Europe to overcome its current divisions
and reach a consensus about the role the European Union should play in international
crises. It is only as a united group that Europeans can be a viable partner for
the United States. Any inßuence that countries may hope to gain by dealing with
the United States individually or in an ad hoc group will be very limited.
Above all, Europeans must agree on when and how military force may be used in
the framework of ESDP. If the United States chose not to act unilaterally, or
not at all, would Europe be ready and able to take its place?
What role can Western European Union and its member countries play in achieving
this goal? Firstly, the organization’s founding treaty contains a mutual
defense clause. I have suggested that this Treaty should be appended to the proposed
new EU Constitutional Treaty in the form of a protocol. This would enable those
EU and NATO members that so wish to express clearly their ambition to assume a
common European responsibility for security and defense policy.
Secondly, the Assembly of WEU, attended by national members of parliament from
28 European countries, provides an inter-parliamentary platform for European security
and defense dialogue. In this forum, Government representatives can explain the
reasons underlying their security and defense-related activities to parliamentarians
who, in their national parliaments, take decisions on defense budgets, troop deployments
and the use of national airspace by foreign forces and who make crucial choices
concerning arms procurement. I hope that in future we can also arrange for the
European Parliament to participate fully in the inter-parliamentary dialogue on
European security and defense issues.
Finally, WEU’s armaments cooperation branch, Western European Armaments
Group (WEAG), is actively pursuing a policy of funding research with a view to
assuring the future of our security and defense industry. In the last six months
alone WEAG has invested over $60 million in defense research projects. A common
approach to security and defense in Europe and a Transatlantic security partnership
have always been, and will continue to be, the cornerstone of Western European
Union.
1 The WEU is a treaty-based security and defense organization. Article V of its founding treaty (the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954) provides for the collective defense of its ten member states: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Article IV of the Treaty links WEU member countries' security to NATO. Since 2000 WEU's military crisis management activities are part of the European Union's emerging European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The Assembly of WEU serves as an inter-parliamentary forum for discussion of ESDP questions. The WEU Presidency rotates in the same way as the Presidency of the European Union, making Greece the current President of both organizations.
2 The Independent Institute is a privately funded research body specializing in the analysis of current policy issues. It is generally critical of government intervention.
Jan Dirk Blaauw is President of the Assembly of Western European Union, the Interparliamentary European Security and Defense Assembly. He was first elected to the Dutch Parliament in 1978, where he has served as Spokesperson for the Liberal Group. He became a member of the Assembly of WEU in 1981, and has served as Chairman of the Liberal Group, Vice-President of the Assembly and Vice-Chairman of both the Defense and the Political Committees.
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