Even if its new constitution is ratified and enters into force,
the European Union will remain a work in progress for the foreseeable
future. Neither its final political character nor its ultimate
borders are yet in sight. The European Union is like an amoeba, a
shapeless but evolving political entity that is always about to
change its structure or to absorb another country. In the globalized
and flexible world of the 21st century, this might prove to be
a decisive asset.
The Union's amorphous nature is not only one of its essential
features, but also a useful survival strategy. The moment you try to
define its characteristics and its final aims, you place it in jeopardy, because there is no
agreement among Europe's governments and citizens on what its future, or even its
present, shape should be. The European Union is probably a state in the making, but it
is unwise to say so, for fear of arousing political opposition.
Now that the Union has expanded to
25 members, and member governments
have approved the constitution, a number
of European and American analysts
are asking whether it has reached the
limits of traditional-style integration -
involving a gradual, long-term progression
from economic to political union -
as first expounded by Jean Monnet, one
of Europe's "Founding Fathers, after
World War II. Some, particularly in the
United States and Britain, are hoping
that the response to this question is Yes. According to the above analysis, however,
the answer is clearly No. First, there
is no such thing as "traditional-style integration;
and second, there are, in principle,
no limits to integration, whether it
involves "widening the Union to embrace
new members or "deepening it to
enhance political cohesion. In the words
of the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus,
"All is flux.
The new constitution, which should
more correctly be called a constitutional
treaty, is riddled with typical EU promises and certainly does not provide
the basis for a European "super-state, as
many of its critics claim. If there is one
clear trend, it is that it will make the European
Union far more diverse and flexible
than it is now. Different groups of
member states will be able to pursue integration
ø in defense, criminal law or
even the harmonization of tax bases
while others can choose to watch from
the sidelines. At the same time, the constitutional
treaty improves the existing
institutional architecture and it is very
likely that, over time, the treaty will
allow incremental changes in the nature
of the European Union. None of this
should be cause for alarm.
Nevertheless, there is a considerable
risk that the treaty will not be ratified. At
least 13 countries, including most importantly
Britain and France, are to hold
referendums on the treaty, but the European
public remains skeptical about European
integration, or, worse, indifferent
to it. In the European Parliament elections
of June 2004, the average voter
turnout was less than 50 percent ø extremely
low by European standards.
It can be debated whether the constitutional
treaty is fundamentally different
from the previous treaties of
Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, and
the technical answer is No. It has, however,
acquired the image, at least symbolically,
of a quantum leap forward. Unlike
in the past, Europe has set up a constitutional
convention and engaged civil society
in the process. For the past two years,
the media have spread the somewhat erroneous
idea that the new treaty is a
"founding act, similar to the U.S. constitution
negotiated in Philadelphia in
1787. Of course, if ratification fails, the
European Union could still carry on
under the Nice Treaty, if more slowly
and less efficiently - just as the United States could have done under the Articles
of Confederation.
Nevertheless, the impression has
been created that this time much more is
at stake and, in a way, it is true, because
for the first time, in theory at least,
member states will have the option of
voluntarily leaving the Union. The referendum
campaigns will probably reduce
the question to a Yes or No to European
integration as a whole, encouraging voters
to believe that they have the false option
of a totally new decision on Europe
from scratch. In reality, however, it is
highly unlikely that one or more countries
will really want to bear all the consequences
of actually leaving the Union.
"For the first time, in theory at least, member states
will have the option of voluntarily leaving the European Union
For many, for instance, the euro (of
which 12 of the 25 EU countries are
members) will constitute a strong tie,
and, if any countries reject the treaty,
legal experts will doubtless devise tortuous
mechanisms to bind them to the European
Union and maintain current
levels of integration.
It will also matter which country
says No. The UK referendum will be
about the UK; the French referendum
will be about Europe as a whole. If the
French say No, the European architecture
will be threatened, as the prospects
for a more integrated "hard core Europe
built around France and Germany would
vanish. If the British say No, the UK will probably try to create a special arrangement,
perhaps including other nay-sayers,
that would keep it in the single
market, without a requirement to engage
in further integration.
The fact remains that while people
often grumble about the European
Union, few of them want to miss out on
its advantages when it comes to the
crunch. Such considerations could also
influence Britain, not least because the
British could find themselves in a difficult
situation if they were the only country
to vote No.
"If the British vote No, the whole question of Britain's
place in Europe will be reopened
If the French accepted the constitution
and the British did not, it is unlikely
that France and Germany would indulgently
negotiate a special agreement with
the UK. Both would probably push the
other 24 countries to move ahead, and
the whole vexed question of Britain's
place in Europe would be reopened - not
just by the other member countries but
by the British themselves.
A question demanding a Yes or No
to Europe is not in fact appropriate for a
referendum, as there are really no other
easy options. If one or more referendums
went against the treaty, the most
likely scenario is that the EU countries
would engage in various opaque forms
of cooperation, in which not all members
would necessarily participate, and remain
in the doldrums until new momentum
for further integration emerged. One argument that may help the Yes
campaigners is that the constitutional
treaty radically improves the participation
of national parliaments in European
decision-making. The treaty, for example,
allows national parliaments to object
to any measure that they think violates
the subsidiarity principle. ("Subsidiarity
means that all decisions should be
made at the lowest possible level,
whether local, regional or national, and
that only those requiring Europe-wide
action should be made in the EU institutions.)
A new subsidiarity protocol states
that if a third of national parliaments
object, the Commission has to review
the proposal. Although this provision
might occasionally slow down decision
making, it would make national MPs
and citizens more involved in European
policy and should help to dispel doubts
about the legitimacy of EU decisions. It
is an "emergency brake that guarantees
that nothing in Europe will get out of
national control.
The basic problem facing the European
Union is that it is trying to both
"deepen and "widen itself rapidly and
simultaneously. The ten new member
countries have not been fully assimilated,
psychologically, politically or economically,
and yet more candidates are
knocking at the door, most prominently
Turkey. There is a risk that even some
supporters of the constitution will vote
No in the referendums simply out of fear
of Turkish membership. Although there
are many shades of opinion, there is significant
resistance to Turkish membership,
particularly in France and
Germany.
The real dividing line, however, is
between those focusing on internal aspects
of the European Union and those
giving greater priority to external issues,especially to the Union's role as a global
actor. Those who want a more globally
responsible European Union to engage
more actively in international relations,
and especially in the Middle East peace
process, argue in favor of Turkish membership.
Although Turkey is unlikely to
join before 2015 at the earliest, supporters
of Turkish entry believe that the
Union would gain influence in the region
once it had borders with Syria, Iraq
and Iran. Turkey would dramatically increase
the population of the European
Union, and over the longer term expand
the European economy, the single market
and ultimately the scope of the euro.
On the other hand, those concerned
about immigration and labor markets,
agricultural spending and structural
funds oppose Turkish membership. The
truth is probably that Turkey can and
must join, but not the European Union
as it is today. The Union is highly unlikely
to spend some Þ20 billion on
Turkish pistachio farmers, as simulations
suggest would be necessary if Turkey
joined under current conditions. The
European Union will have to undergo
deep structural changes before Turkey
can enter; and Turkey still has much to
do in order to comply with the acquis
communautaire, the full corpus of EU
rules and legislation.
The European Union will have to be
fundamentally redefined. It will have to
change from an entity largely concerned
with economic and social redistribution
via its agricultural, cohesion and structural
funds) into a global actor that
spends more money on military capability,
border protection and perhaps research
and development. This process
will not be easy politically, since there
will be strong opposition from domestic
sectors, especially farmers, in nearly
every country.And it should not be forgotten that,
in the end, Turkish membership will
have to be ratified by all the EU member
states, which will by then probably number
27 or more, as well as by the European
Parliament and by Turkey itself. So
Turkey is not yet already almost a member,
as some in the United States tend to
think. It is most likely that Turkish entry
negotiations will last for a decade or so.
"The EU will have to become a global actor that spends more money
on military capability and border protection
Plenty of other countries are also
lining up for membership. They include
the Balkan states, which have already
been promised admission some day, as
well as Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.
Although few take it seriously, there has
even been talk in some quarters of Morocco
and Israel. All these potential candidates
are exerting pressure on the
European Union, squeezing it between
its desire to expand stability and the
danger of importing instability by admitting
even more far-flung members.
The point is that the European
Union has a supreme interest in stabilizing
these countries politically and economically,
but cannot offer the "golden
carrot of membership for the time
being. The "European Neighborhood
Policy strategy paper issued in May
2004 is an attempt to cope with this situation.
The paper spells out policies for
tying these countries to the European
Union through trade and other assis-tance programs. The "silver carrot
would be to grant them access to European
markets ø including labor and agricultural
markets ø but with a status
falling somewhat short of full membership.
(Some, of course, might also see
that as the best solution for Turkey). It
remains to be seen whether the European
Union will have the open mind and
the economic resources necessary to
make such offers. But it is likely to proceed
in this direction, if slowly. The EU
mindset lies somewhere in between
"never say never and "one thing at a time.
The future development of the European
Union will depend entirely on
the political will of its institutions and its
member states. But the constitutional treaty does, in theory, pave the way for
an international actor role. In addition
to the appointment of a foreign minister,
the treaty improves the handling of foreign,
security and defense policies in
many ways. It provides for "implementation
decisions to be adopted by a
"super-qualified majority (72 percent
of the member states representing 65
percent of the EU population), although
only on the basis of unanimously agreed
strategic objectives. It widens the scope
for majority voting by including certain
proposals from the EU foreign minister,
although the veto would remain if "vital
national interests were asserted.
In defense policy, the treaty makes it
easier for a subset of EU countries to work together more closely on military
matters, using a procedure known as
"structured cooperation.Member states
that met a set of capability-based criteria
could choose to cooperate more closely ø
subject to approval by a majority of the
Council.
"The EU will start the inevitable process of cutting the
umbilical cord joining it to the United States
So a smaller group of the most willing
and best-prepared countries could
run the Union's more demanding military
missions. EU peacekeeping efforts
in Macedonia, Congo and now Bosnia
show that the Union is taking its first
steps toward greater and more coordinated
military intervention, although
such operations fall well short of actual
warfare.
In addition, the creation of an EU
diplomatic service should forge common
thinking on foreign policy, and, over
time, provide fertile soil for genuine,
joint European diplomacy. Against this
background, it is likely that NATO will
soon no longer provide the main
politico-military structure for the European
continent, and that the European
Union will start the inevitable process of
cutting the umbilical cord joining it to
the United States.
In its European Security Strategy,
adopted by the European Council in December
2003, the European Union for
the first time spelled out its vision of a
comprehensive security policy based
largely on Á¡soft-powerÁ± instruments.
With this step, the European Union is
starting to defend its own vision of the
world, and opinion surveys suggest that
an average 80 percent of all Europeans
want more independence from the
United States. However slow and limping
the process may be, the European
Union is undergoing deep changes in its
identity, triggered by the constitution.
These changes are bound at some point
to have an impact on Transatlantic relations,
which will have to be redefined.
No, Europe has not reached the limits
of integration. More than ever it is
shaping what could be called a noble adventure.
It is forging a European Dream
that promises to endow humanity with a
Á¡global consciousnessÁ± that reflects the
emergence of an increasingly interconnected
and globalizing society and emphasizes
global cooperation over the
unilateral exercise of power. In doing so,
the European Union might become the
real superpower of the post-modern
world in the 21st century.
New Constitution Should Make the Union
More Efficient The proposed new EU constitution
is not a real constitution in the traditional sense, because its
authors did not enjoy what is normally considered legitimate constitution-
making authority. Instead, it was approved by an EU Intergovernmental
Conference (IGC), a body empowered to endorse changes to the Union's
basic treaties. The document should thus correctly be described
as a constitutional treaty, a rulebook for relations among the
member states, not a constitution governing the relationship between
a state and its citizens. Nevertheless, it is a pragmatic and
sensible attempt to improve the efficiency and the flexibility
of the enlarged European Union, to increase the Union's legitimacy
by giving more say to parliamentarians, both in the European Parliament
and in national legislatures, and to make it easier for EU governments
ø whether all together or in smaller groups ø to collaborate in
certain tightly defined areas, such as internal security and defense.
The treaty contains a number of opt-outs, opt-ins, "emergency
brakesand "accelerators in many sensitive areas, such as foreign
policy, defense and police and judicial cooperation. But on both
the policies and the budget, the member states ultimately keep
the final say. The most important innovations include the appointment
of a new, less transitory President of the Council, the end of
the current system under which the presidency rotates among member
governments every six months and the creation of the new post
of European Foreign Minister. The President of the Council, to
be elected by unanimity by the other Council members (the Heads
of State and Government) for a renewable term of two and a half
years, will streamline and prioritize European decision making.
Together with the Foreign Minister, the President will give the
European Union a "single face and voice,not least in its dealings
with the United States. In addition, the constitutional treaty
caps the number of European Commissioners at two-thirds of the
number of member states by 2014, with all states having an equal
right to appoint a Commissioner. This means that each member state
will have a Commissioner in Brussels for two out of every three
Commission terms. This is a radical departure, in that the European
Union is for the first time abandoning the principle of complete
national representation in the Commission. Taken together, all
this should not only enhance the efficiency of the European Union,
but also lay the basis for its future role as a "global actor.Equally
significant is the reform of voting procedures in the Council
of Ministers, under which a new "double majorityprovision will
come into force in 2009. This will be far simpler than the current,
fiendishly complicated "triple majorityarrangement, agreed in
the Nice Treaty of 2000. Under the new system, a measure will
pass if it is supported by 55 percent of the member states, provided
that they represent 65 percent of the EU population. The new voting
rules should ensure that EU decision making does not grind to
a halt in the enlarged Union. The treaty's simplicity and transparency
will be somewhat undermined by a series of "safeguards,and by
some higher voting thresholds in especially sensitive areas such
as foreign and security policy. Nevertheless, recent simulations
suggest that the new rules will make it as easy for 25 or more
member states to agree on a measure as it was before 1995, when
the Union had only 12 members. The constitutional treaty also
reduces the number of policy areas that require unanimous agreement,
thus preserving the national veto.
The good news for advocates of further integration is that the treaty extends majority
voting to 44 new areas (admittedly with some "emergency brakes); the bad news is
that, apart from justice and home affairs, most of these areas are of minor importance.
They are primarily concerned with the implementation of existing policies rather than
the development of new ones. The national veto remains on "red-lineissues that some
governments have declared to be non-negotiable, such as taxation, defense and the EU
budget. But there is also a clause that allows the extension of majority voting in the future,
provided all member states agree, without having to re-negotiate and re-ratify the
whole treaty. Such modest, innocent-sounding stipulations might hugely accelerate the
dynamics of integration in the future, if all the member states are willing.
A highly important, if largely overlooked, development is the treaty provision for
supranational or "federatedmanagement of the whole policy area of home and justice
affairs, formerly run on an intergovernmental basis. This means that home and justice
affairs will be subject to procedures for "co-decisionwith the European Parliament and
to rulings by the European Court of Justice. The Commission will have the right of initiative.
The European Union, in fact, will leave behind the famous "three pillarstructure
laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, under which separate policy areas came under different
degrees of control by the EU institutions, and become a unified legal body with a
legal personality. Together with the recent appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker, the
Prime Minister of Luxembourg, as "Mr. Euro,these provisions will theoretically enable
the European Union to be jointly represented in international institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund, and, eventually, the G-8. Finally, the insertion into the
treaty of the European Charter of Human Rights rounds off the picture of a newly constituted
Union.
Ulrike GuŽrot is Director of Foreign Policy, Europe in the German Marshall Fund's Berlin office,
where she focuses on a broad range of Transatlantic issues. Her previous posts include Head of the
EU-Unit at the Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin; Deputy Director,
Department of European and International Affairs, German Employer's Association; Senior
Research Fellow, Groupement d'Etudes et de Recherches ÔNotre Europe;' and Director of Communication,
Association of the Monetary Union of Europe.
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