Lenin has gone out of fashion in Europe these days. But his piercing appraisal of
the central question of power politics, "Who dominates whom?, could hardly be more
pertinent as the European Union continues to grapple with the implications of its
May 2004 enlargement.
To say that things have changed in the relationship between Brussels and the eight
new members from former communist Central and Eastern Europe is to state the obvious.
For the best part of a decade and a half, after all, the power disparity defining
that relationship was about as asymmetrical as one can imagine in the peaceful sphere
of international relations. One side wanted to get in; the other held the keys to the
door and could open or close it at will. Now, the carrot and the stick, dangled and
wielded to such great effect in securing democratic, market transformation in the former
communist states, are no more. The rules of the game have changed.
It is still too early to define with
great certainty the long-term consequences
of enlargement, either for the
European Union or for the accession
countries themselves. But, half a year
into the biggest expansion in the European
Union's history, clues have begun
to emerge. There have also been some
surprises.
Even before enlargement, though
with the certain knowledge that it would
go ahead, Poland, with a population as
big as the rest of the accession countries
combined, showed it had muscle to flex. Together with Spain, Poland blocked the
signing of the proposed new European
constitution at the EU summit in December
2003. Six months later, with
Spain ready to compromise, Poland had
little choice but to back down, accepting
the political impossibility of standing
alone against the remaining 24 EU
members.
Even with Poland's retreat, however,
it was clear that something had irreversibly
changed in the way that the European
Union manages its affairs. Poland
had become a partner to be bargained
with rather than a candidate to be lectured.
Poland could be a useful ally or an
awkward opponent. As a member of the
club, Poland mattered.
The agreement on the constitutional
treaty, of course, was merely the first act
in a drama yet to unfold. In Central and
Eastern Europe, both Poland and the
Czech Republic have signaled that they
will hold referendums on the constitution,
while most of the other countries
will almost certainly vote (supportively)
on the treaty in national parliaments. In
theory at least, rejection by any single
country would render the treaty invalid.
So, will the Poles and the Czechs say Yes
or No?
A poll conducted by the PBS polling
agency just after EU leaders approved
the treaty in June suggested that 47 percent
of Poles would vote in favor, with a
third opposed and 20 percent undecided.
A Eurobarometer survey published
by the European Commission in July put
support for the general principle of a
European constitution (though not necessarily
the one proposed) at 71 percent
in Poland and 65 percent in the Czech
Republic. Brussels has taken encouragement
from these figures. But it may be
more than a year before the referendums
are held, during which time opinions
could obviously shift.
Moreover, the rules established to
validate the results of the referendums
will be as important as the preferences
expressed. Should either country impose
a 50 percent turnout threshold, as was
the case in Poland's referendum on joining
the European Union in 2003, there
could be real problems. In elections to
the European Parliament in June 2004
only 28 percent of eligible voters cast
their ballots in the Czech Republic, and
fewer than 21 percent in Poland. Unless
referendums are timed to coincide with domestic national elections ø which they
may be ø it is difficult to see how a 50
percent turnout could be achieved.
Turnout, of course, was the big story
in the elections to the European Parliament
themselves. In the new member
countries as a whole, the turnout was a
meager 26 percent, compared with a far
from impressive 45.7 percent for the entire
25-nation Union. The conclusion
widely drawn in the new member states
is that enlargement has taken Europe
further away from the shared political
culture that is the prerequisite to closer
and deeper integration. Enlargement has
reaffirmed the belief that the primary
sense of political identity in the European
Union is more deeply rooted in the
nation state than ever.
"Polls show support for the general principle of a European constitution,
though not necessarily the one proposed
Seen from Central Europe, deeper
integration still looks possible among a
so-called hard core of mostly West European
countries, but not throughout the
European Union per se. This more than
anything else is the most significant result
of enlargement. As Europe has come
together, it is achieving greater clarity (at
least for those who are prepared to face
up to it) about what it really is and the
limits to what it can become.
Concrete evidence to support this
conclusion has already been provided by
Franco-German efforts to revive the idea
of a unified corporate tax rate across the European Union to prevent the new
Central and Eastern European members
from luring away investment through
"unfair tax competition. The proposal
was taken by most new member governments
as an affront to all that they
have worked for in reforming their
economies.
The star performer in this respect
has been Slovakia, where Finance Minister
Ivan Miklos succinctly described the
Franco-German proposal as "absurd.
Slovakia unified its corporate, income
and value added taxes at a flat rate of 19
percent in January 2004, a move that led
Steve Forbes, a business magazine
owner, former U.S. presidential candidate
and long-time flat tax advocate, to
describe Slovakia as an "investors' paradise.
In September 2004, the World
Bank named Slovakia the best reformer
in the world in its 2003 survey of global
business conditions.
"Central and Eastern Europeans see significant shortcomings
in the economic performance of the West
Praise of this sort stands in sharp
contrast to what Central and Eastern Europeans
inevitably see as significant
shortcomings in the economic performance
of the West.While the economy of
the 12-nation euro zone grew at an annual
rate of two percent in the second
quarter of 2004, Poland achieved yearon-
year growth of 6.1 percent. Slovakia
grew by 5.4 percent, Hungary by 4 percent,
the Czech Republic by 4.1 percent
and Latvia by 7.7 percent. Although these figures must be seen
in the context of the smaller economic
base from which the new members are
starting, it is still difficult for the newcomers
to believe that the older members
have much to teach them. It is even
harder to imagine the Central and Eastern
European countries adopting the
kind of high-tax policies embraced by
France and Germany, which could stifle
their robust economic growth. Fundamental
disputes on economic policy between
East and West are likely to endure.
Nevertheless, one widely expected
cause of friction on economic policy between
new and old EU members has so
far failed to materialize. Poland's much
discussed farmers ø who represent 16
percent of the country's labor force and
work on around 2.9 million farms ø
were initially angered by the European
Union's decision to phase in their Common
Agricultural Policy subsidies over
several years, rather than give them their
full due at once. But in one of the great
surprises of the months following enlargement,
such bitterness appears to be
subsiding.
A CBOS opinion poll in September
2004, for instance, put support for the
European Union at an astonishing 67
percent among Polish farmers, compared
with 50 percent at the start of the
year. One obvious explanation is the feel
good factor following forecasts of a
record harvest by Polish Minister of
Agriculture Wojciech Olejniczak. That
may have more to do with good weather
than with European Union membership.
Nevertheless, EU membership has
already brought some concrete benefits.
Polish farmers were allocated subsidies
worth Þ2 billion in October, which,
while far short of the sums doled out to
their French counterparts, were still welcomed
as a tangible, positive conse-quence of EU entry. "Structural pension
funds, partly financed by the European
Union, have also begun to kick in. The
system, effectively an early retirement
package for those over 55, offers Þ640
million of EU money over the next two
and a half years to eligible farmers willing
to hand over their farms to the state.
Initial reports suggest a positive response
to the offer.
A big increase has also been reported
in purchases of Polish farm products
from abroad, especially from Germany,
which has turned Poland into a net exporter
of food. The government expects
a large food trade surplus with the rest of
the European Union this year, leading
Mr. Olejniczak to talk of a "complete
turnaround in the atmosphere in the
countryside.
At official level, the relationship in
Brussels between new and old member
states has been shaped by the "twinning
arrangement under which the newcomers
nominated officials to "shadow
members of the outgoing European
Commission under President Romano
Prodi for the last six months of its term.
As a sign of their enthusiasm and the
seriousness with which they take their
new status in the EU, the new members
have tended to nominate their most senior
and respected officials for posts in
Brussels. The Czech Republic, for example,
named a former prime minister,
Vladimir Spidla, as its representative on
the Commission, and Hungary chose a
former foreign minister, L‡szl— Kov‡cs.
The most pressing problems for the
new entrants in Brussels have been mundane
rather than political. "There hasn't
really been much obvious friction between
the new members and the old on
the political level, at least not yet, says
Hana Lesenarova, Brussels Correspondent
for the Czech Republic's leading newspaper Mlada Fronta Dnes. "Logistical
problems such as translating all the
documents and memos have been much
bigger problems. There have been efforts
to limit the size and length of many documents
to cope with things like translating
from Czech into Finnish. There's the
related problem of documents being
translated from one language into English,
for example, and then from English
into another language. That has left a
of potential for mistakes and misunderstandings.
"Small countries have more influence in the European Parliament
than anywhere else
In the European Parliament, some
deputies from the new member countries
have adapted to life in the European
Union with relish. In an interview in the
Baltic Times in late October, Toomas
Hendrik Ilves, a former Estonian foreign
minister now a member of the European
Parliament, dismissed suggestions the
new members, especially the smaller
ones, were being treated as ignorant
newcomers. "It was pleasant to be received
as a full member, Mr. Ilves said.
"Despite all the moaning and complaining
and the nihilistic self-loathing from
small countries that, ÔOh, we can't make
our voice heard at all, it's not true. In
fact, small countries have more influence
in the European Parliament than anywhere
else up to now, he added. "On top
of that, there are exceptionally good people
from among the new member states.
In foreign affairs, the prospects for a
meaningful EU common policy, at least on the big issues, remain as bleak as
ever,
in the view of most Central and Eastern
European analysts. The war in Iraq continues
to create divisions between "Old
and "New Europe, to use Donald Rumsfeld's
notorious distinction. But the issue
has tended to bubble beneath the surface
without noticeably exacerbating problems
that already existed before enlargement.
To be sure, the Central and Eastern
Europeans have not forgotten the stinging
rebuke they received from French
President Jacques Chirac when they
dared to disagree with him and support
the United States on Iraq - before they
had joined the European Union. All
eight of the new EU members from Central
and Eastern Europe, it will be recalled,
signed letters of support for the
U.S. position before the outbreak of war.
Apart from Poland, which has sent 2,400
troops to Iraq, actual participation in the
conflict has been mainly symbolic. Hungary
has 300 troops in the war zone,
while the other new members have 150
or fewer.
Nevertheless, despite a small but rising
casualty count, widespread public
opposition and a continuing debate
about how long their forces should remain
in Iraq, the new member states had
shown few signs of reversing their policies
of supporting Washington. It is too
soon to say whether this stoutly Atlanticist
line will be sustained on other looming
issues, such as Iran's nuclear
program, mainly because the position of
all parties involved remains fluid.
In one largely unforeseen development
since enlargement, some new
member governments are starting to use
their leverage as EU insiders to deal with
problems with their non-EU neighbors.
The most recent flashpoint has been the
Serbian province of Vojvodina, home to
around 300,000 ethnic Hungarians. The
Hungarian authorities have become embroiled
in an increasingly vituperative
dispute with Serbia over alleged Á¡atrocitiesÁ±
perpetrated by Serbian nationalists
against ethnic Hungarians, reportedly
including the desecration of tombstones,
a proliferation of anti-Hungarian graffiti,
burning of the Hungarian flag and a
police attack on a mayor representing
the Hungarian minority.
To the consternation of the Serbian
authorities, Hungary has raised the matter
in the European Union, thus enabling
Budapest to wield a diplomatic stick it
did not possess before it became an EU
member. Other such disputes have broken
out between new EU member Slovenia
and non-member Croatia, and
between Cyprus, which has just joined,
and Turkey which is still seeking EU entry.
EU foreign policy making since enlargement
has thus had to cope not
merely with the quantitative problem of
coordinating policy in a Union with ten
more members, but also with the qualitative
problem of having imported some
of the new membersÁÃ historic foreign
policy disputes.
Finally, as the UnionÁÃs borders have
shifted eastward, the absence of a viable
EU policy toward Ukraine, Belarus and
Moldova is keenly felt in many of the
new member states. It would be fitting
indeed if the new EU members from
Central and Eastern Europe could persuade
Brussels to offer these countries
the prospects of integration into the
family of European nations from which
they themselves have so singularly benefited.
Robin Shepherd is an adjunct fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies
based in Bratislava. Formerly the Moscow Bureau Chief of The Times of London, he writes a regular
column for UPI as well as occasional columns for a variety of publications including The
Washington Post, the The Wall Street Journal Europe and the Chicago Tribune. His book,
Czechoslovakia: The Velvet Revolution and Beyond was published by Macmillan/St. Martins
Press in 2000.
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