Ever since Turkey took its first step toward the European Union by signing
an Association Agreement with the then European Community in
1963, the country's road to EU membership has run into constant
obstacles and frustrations. Neither side is free of blame. Many
of the difficulties have been caused by profound differences
in social and political cultures, and exacerbated by the almost
continuous efforts of opponents in both Turkey and the European
Union to thwart or delay the prospect of Turkish EU entry. The
problems besetting Turkey's lengthy quest for EU membership
can be grouped into two main categories. These are "identity
issues, relating to whether Turkey really belongs in Europe
in terms of culture, religion and geography, and "scale issues,
concerning Turkey's size, poor infrastructure and economic backwardness.
These issues will determine the agenda and the outcome of the
negotiations for Turkish entry that will probably finally start
some time next year. Photo: imijphoto.com
While Turkey's bid for EU membership is far from universally
welcome in the European Union, it has also always faced political
problems at home. Until the end of the 1990s, powerful political
factions at either end of Turkey's political spectrum were deeply
suspicious of EU membership, if not completely opposed to it.
Secular nationalists objected to the transfer of sovereignty
to EU institutions, while Islamists feared that Europe's Christian
heritage might foil their decades-long effort to achieve a Turkish
Islamic revival. As a result, Turkey's approach to the European
Union has often been hesitant. Now, by pressing for the start
of entry negotiations, Turkey is finally inviting the European
Union to decide whether the country can meet the qualifications
for EU membership, and whether it is sincere in trying to do
so. In examining these questions, it will be vital for the European
Union's existing members to understand the deep historical,
political, cultural and religious tensions in Turkish society
that have yet to be resolved. If there are continuing doubts
as to whether Turkey really belongs in Europe, it is largely
because the final nature of the country's modern identity is
still unclear - as is that of the European Union itself.
Many hope that the negotiations, which could last ten to 15
years, will not only help to define Turkey's status in the modern
world, but also provide an opportunity for the European Union
to examine its own values and identity. In a sense it must do
so, in order to decide whether Turkey conforms with them. The
Turkish drive to become a modern, Westernized nation has been
conducted predominantly by the welleducated elite, including
the military, which has sought to keep the country on the secular
path charted by Mustafa Kemal AtatŸrk, the founder of the Turkish
Republic in 1923. Turkish secularism, however, is not like the
American variety, which allows any kind of religion to flourish
provided it does not try to impose the dictates of its theology
on the public life of the nation and hence cross the often-contested
line dividing church and state. Turkey's approach is more in
line with the French tradition of proactively seeking to keep
religion out of public life, to maintain secularity by strictly
controlling religion, both in its practice and its symbols.
The Turkish State, insofar as it is represented by the traditional
decision making elites, still suspects that Islamist activists
want to reshape society in accordance with Islamic principles.
This suspicion, together with the related fear of a counter-revolution
against modernization, has been the main determinant of relations
between the followers of AtatŸrk and the Islamists. Turkish
governments, however, have not always succeeded in following
an unwavering course to what AtatŸrk called "contemporary civilization.
In the last half century there have been three coups d'Žtat
- in May 1960, March 1970 and September 1980 - and the 14 general
elections that have been held since 1950 have produced 59 different
governments, which is not a strong sign of political stability.
Often, the traditional decisionmaking elites, as represented
mainly by the military, the civil bureaucracy and big business,
seem to have regarded modernization as a process calling for
the alignment of Turkey's national interests with those of the
West, but not for the adoption of Western values.
"Turkish secularity is similar to the French tradition
of proactively seeking to keep religion out of public life
This attitude was perhaps not surprising during the Cold War,
when it led Turkey, as a NATO member, to forge closer relations
with the United States than with Western Europe. In Turkey's
view, the tilt toward Washington was further justified by the
belief that Western Europe had delegated its defense largely
to the United States, in exchange for a freer hand to promote
its own economic development. In these circumstances, a long
stalemate ensued, both in Turkey's relations with the European
Union and in the domestic Turkish political debate on EU membership.
Although Turkey continued to seek the establishment of a customs
union and ultimately full EU membership, neither Brussels nor
Ankara was entirely candid about the realities of their relationship.
It could almost be said that decision-makers on both sides were
happy with the stalemate, as it relieved them of any obligation
to spend political capital to resolve the deadlock.
"Earlier Islamist leaders condemned the EU as ÔCrusader
community' with which it would be unlawful to have close relations.
A change in the climate came from an unexpected source - the
self-proclaimed "Muslim Democrat Justice and Development Party
(AKP), which took power after winning elections in November
2002. To the surprise of some commentators in the West, the
AKP has passed eight "reform packages in succession, aimed
at aligning Turkey more closely with values and practices in
the European Union. These developments are particularly startling
in that many AKP leaders, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, were once disciples of Necmettin Erbakan, the former
head of the National Order Party (MNP), the first party of professed
Islamic origins in modern Turkish political history, who was
a bitter opponent of the European Union. In 1970, Mr. Erbakan
put down two motions of no confidence against the right of center
government of Suleyman Demirel for seeking closer relations
with the European Union in a manner he said was "unlawful and
against the national interest. Mr. Erbakan said that his party
"would not allow the beloved motherland to be left to the exploitation
of foreigners under the disguise of trade. Leaders of the Islamist
movement from which the AKP is descended frequently labeled
the European Union a "Crusader community. They believed that
Turkish EU membership was being promoted by people unfaithful
to the true religion, who regarded Islam as an enemy of social
development but refrained from saying so openly. How then, with
these antecedents, has the AKP come to proclaim EU membership
a "national goal and a main pillar of its governmental program?
The answer starts with the forced resignation of Mr. Erbakan
as Prime Minister in 1997, following intense pressure from the
military and his political opponents, and the banning of the
Welfare Party, of which he was then the leader, the following
year. The so-called reformist wing of the Welfare Party concluded
that the radical tone of the party leadership was the greatest
obstacle preventing the political Islamist movement from wining
an election and holding onto power. The reformists formed a
new party, the AKP, with the aim of appealing to the floating
voters that traditionally constitute almost 65 percent of the
electorate. To this end, AKP leaders including Mr. Erdogan and
Abdullah Gul, now Foreign Minister, renounced the party's Islamist
roots and laid claim to a "Muslim Democrat identity, analogous
to the Christian Democrat parties of Europe. The question now
is whether this apparently radical transformation is genuine.
If it is not, the prospects for a successful conclusion to Turkey's
EU entry negotiations will be considerably dimmer. Many of Turkey's
secularists are deeply suspicious of Mr. Erdogan's change of
heart, which they see as a pragmatic, tactical maneuver. They
doubt political Islam's ability to transform itself, and find
plenty of ammunition in Mr. Erdogan's pre-AKP speeches, in which
he described democracy "not as an end but as a means and upheld
the principles of Islam as "the supreme determinant. It is
not hard to see the legacy of that attitude in the government's
recent clash with Brussels over its attempt (since withdrawn)
to criminalize adultery as part of a reformed penal code. One
of Mr. Erdogan's remarks - "We would be denying ourselves if
we try to take Europe as our model in its entirety - provoked
harsh reactions not only in the European Union but also in the
mainstream Turkish media. Until then, the media had generally
been very tolerant, if not supportive of the AKP. The incident
highlighted the continuing divisions between the radical Islamist
grassroots of the AKP and its reformist wing. In the words of
a European diplomat, "Turkey's EU bid remains the AKP's top
priority. But the party still has to cope with a large part
of its support base that still has an idea and vision of society
that is characterized by pretty conservative religious ideas
and traditions. The fact that nobody knows the strength of
that part of the AKP's base is a real concern, not only for
Turkey's potential EU partners but also, and perhaps even more
so, for the country's secular elite. An important indicator,
however, is that while the AKP won an astounding 45 percent
of the vote in municipal elections in March 2004, opinion polls
have consistently shown that only nine to 11 percent of the
electorate favor the introduction of strict Islamic sharia law.Most
of Turkey's radical Islamists are also split into religious
sects with divergent voting behaviors. Analysis of recent voting
patterns suggests that the majority of the AKP's electoral base
does not consist of hard liners, even if hard liners play a
powerful role in the party organization.
"We would be denying ourselves if we try to take Europe as our
model in its entirety
There seems to be wide agreement among both EU and Turkish analysts
that the AKP's determination to adopt a pragmatic and realistic
attitude in dealing with setbacks will keep it on track for
EU membership. Many believe that the party is ready to subordinate
its Islamist ideas to the aim of getting closer to the European
Union. Certainly, for the time being, the party's reformists
seem to have been given a free hand to direct policy, including
on EU issues. The possibility nevertheless remains that the
pressures of the entry negotiations could split the party in
two. That risk makes it even more important for the party for
look for ways of increasing its popular appeal. The AKP's Islamic
roots already make it difficult for it to govern on its own
in an officially, and effectively, secular country, and the
party has reached the limits of the support it can expect from
its natural con- stituents. From now on, in order to sustain
its power and broaden its popular base, the party needs more
legitimacy or more resources, or preferably both. This is a
big reason why the approach to the European Union is so important
for the AKP. Party leaders are well aware that if they are to
enlarge their share of the vote, they must make the case that
their plans for Turkey's future include higher standards of
living.Most Turks voted for the AKP not because they wanted
greater role for Islam, but because they were unhappy with their
material living conditions. The political future of the AKP
will depend more on whether it can raise living standards than
on any other issue.
"Islamist leaders believe that Turkish membership will help
transform the EU into a union more to their liking
One problem is that once the EU negotiations start, many Turks
may quickly become disillusioned if an immediate improvement
in living standards fails to materialize. However na•ve such
a reaction might be, it could lead to drastic drop in support
for EU membership. The almost inevitable disappointment will
have to be managed very carefully, both by the Turkish government,
whether it is formed by the AKP or another party, and by the
EU authorities. But support for EU membership does not stem
simply from economic calculations. Since the ousting of the
Welfare Party from government in 1997, most political Islamists
have begun to see the European Union in a new light. They now
believe that EU membership could help to transform Turkey into
a more relaxed secular society in which the authorities would
be obliged to ease controls on religion. Their hope is that,
in the name of human rights, the European Union will strongly
promote religious freedoms, including lifting the ban on women
wearing Muslim headscarves in Turkish public institutions, and
even help establish the Islamists' right to finance and administer
their own schools,. These hopes suffered a serious double blow
with France's recent ban on Muslim headscarves in schools and
the rejection of headscarf-related complaints from Turkish students
by the European Court of Human Rights in June 2004. Nevertheless
political Islamists are still confident that the process of
negotiating EU membership will help to loosen the restrictions
imposed under the AtatŸrk tradition.
In the words of one of their leaders, "The European Union is
for sure not an ideal, an utopia or an earthly paradise, but
[rather represents] a struggle to get rid of an infernal situation.
The European Union is, at most, hypothetically harmful, [whereas]
the nation-state status quo is actually harmful now. Arguing,
correctly, that the European Union "is not a completed project,
the Islamists believe that Turkish membership will help to transform
it into a kind of union that is more to their liking. The problem
with this view is that it has already raised expectations among
hardcore AKP supporters. Failure to deliver results, in terms
of greater freedom for Islam, could create great disillusionment
and strengthen Islamic opposition to the European Union. If,
on the other hand, such hopes were fulfilled, and EU entry looked
like strengthening the role of Islam in Turkish society, there
would be an even stronger counter-reaction from the secularists.
This approach, however, does not represent the official position
of the AKP government. And any suggestion that EU membership
would somehow encourage a revival of Islam in Turkey, or the
spread of Islam to the West, will be closely watched by the
Turkish Armed Forces, the ultimate guardians of the AtatŸrk
tradition. Nevertheless, there is a widespread belief that the
traditional decision making elites are not reacting strongly
against the AKP mainly because they are afraid of being criticized
by the European Union for infringing civil liberties and democratic
rights. This seems to apply especially to the Armed Forces,
which have always seen themselves as the initiators and leading
promoters of modernism and Westernization. It is for this reason
that the Army, under its current Chief of Staff General Hilmi
Ozkok, has deliberately allowed the AKP government to diminish
the military's traditionally heavy weight in the country's political
system. During the past two years the Armed Forces have avoided
any move that could be interpreted as endangering EU membership.
Such a move could in fact be highly unpopular. Over the last
five years public support for Turkish EU membership has dramatically
increased, to around 70 percent today. According to a Eurobarometer
survey published by the European Commission, about 55 percent
of Turks have a positive image of the European Union. That is
almost 10 percentage points higher than the average in the 15
countries that were EU members before the latest enlargement,
and 15 percentage percentage points higher than in the ten new
members that joined in May 2004. It is interesting, however,
that while Turks are highly sympathetic to the European Union,
even fewer Turks than Americans agree with the statement: "The
EU should become a superpower like the United States. That
attitude confirms suspicions in some quarters that Turkey will
not support the evercloser European integration favored by countries
like France and Germany, and might even play the role of a U.S.
Trojan horse inside the European Union.While such suspicions
are overly simplistic, it is true that at least for the time
being Turks favor the European Union mainly as an economic and
political safe haven, rather than as a player in global power
games.
"Many American leaders have argued that Turkey would
give the EU more strategic muscle
This is somewhat ironic, given that one of the main potential
assets of Turkish EU membership is precisely that it could help
the Union achieve its aim of playing a stronger role on the
world stage. With the European Union's current demographic and
social structures, skeptical public opinion and a lack of leadership,
some analysts believe it will be difficult for Europe to become
an influential participant in the global power struggles of
the 21st century - not least for lack of military muscle. Seen
from Ankara, Turkey is the only country apart from Russia that
could bring the Euro-pean Union the resources necessary to change
this picture ø and Russia is unlikely to be available for such
a role. American leaders have openly promoted the idea of Turkish
EU membership for this very reason. Celebrities ranging from
former President Bill Clinton to Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz and billionaire financier George Soros have all
said that Turkey, with its population of nearly 70 million,
could and should provide new muscle for the European Union.
"If the EU is to decide whether Turkey conforms to European
values, it should be able to define those values
But while many European policy makers are inclined to agree
with this argument, they have difficulty explaining it to their
publics. Such thoughts are simply not in harmony with the spirit
of the times in Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, European
politicians have been rather thoughtlessly conveying to their
citizens that they are living in what American analyst Robert
Kagan calls a, "post-historical paradise of peace and relative
prosperity. European leaders, in fact, have done very little
to promote a healthy debate on Turkey's potential role in Europe,
or to persuade the general public to take a favorable view of
Turkish EU membership. As a result, most Europeans look at Turkey's
entry bid in terms of shortsighted political priorities and
anxieties, rather than in the light of an unobstructed strategic
vision. Even more seriously for Turkey, some European leaders
have made statements that seem to confirm Europe's historical
prejudices against the country. The Vatican has opposed Turkish
EU entry, expressing the view that Europe must fight to retain
its Christian identity. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, President
of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, has said
that it would be a "mistake to equate Asia, which Turkey has
always represented, with Europe, the roots of which "are those
of Christianity. Former French President ValŽry Giscard d'Estaing
has said that if Turkey joined the European Union, it would
be "the end of Europe. One should not take Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's
remark too literally. He was implying that Turkish entry would
put an end to the kind of deep economic and political integration
launched by the six original EU members in the 1950s, with the
aim of building an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether remarks such as these,
still less the comments of Cardinal Ratzinger, have served their
intended purposes. On the contrary, they seem to have strengthened
the argument that denying Turkey a chance of membership would
constitute unfair bigotry, deriving from Europe's own crisis
of identity. In this view, a refusal to open talks with Turkey
would deprive the West of a great opportunity to prove that
its values and ideas transcend specific cultures and civilizations
and encompass all of humanity. This debate is likely to intensify,
both in Europe and in Turkey, and to have a significant influence
on the course of the negotiations. Many Turks argue that if
the European Union is to decide whether Turkey conforms to European
values, it should be able to define what those values are, and
state whether they are universal or limited to the European
geographical area. If the European Union stands for democracy,
human rights, diversity and tolerance, as it says it does, a
restricted definition of its identity based on religion, race
or geography would negate those fundamental principles. In this
respect, comments like those of Cardinal Ratzinger should not
be viewed as mainly Turkey's problem. They rather reflect the
European Union's own identity crisis. Turkey's accession is
only to a limited degree about Turkey. To the extent that it
is about Turkey, it is about Europe's image of Turkey, rather
than how Turkey really is. And even if Turkey is different,
it represents an opportunity for Europe, rather than a threat,
provided Turkey embraces the European Union's fundamental values
of democracy, tolerance and human rights. That is particularly
true in the post 9/11 world. Europe cannot afford to draw a
border at the edge of its civilization that does not include
Turkey, simply because Turkey is a Muslim country with 95 percent
of its landmass and population geographically outside Europe.
As President Bashar al-Asad of Syria clearly stated during a
recent visit to Turkey, those Middle East countries that see
radical Islam as a threat are keen to be "neighbors of Europe.
The rejection of Turkey's bid for EU membership would not strengthen
the hands of these countries against terrorism - especially
if it hindered Turkey's economic development. Nor would Turkey's
exclusion from the European Union do much to prevent the increasing
infiltration of Islamic values into Europe, about which some
Europeans are so alarmed. That process is likely to continue
whether or not Turkey joins the European Union. Indeed, London,
Paris and Munich are probably already more infected by Islamic
radicalism than Istanbul. In the light of current demographic
trends, it is perfectly possible to argue that by the end of
this century "Europe will be a part of the Maghreb, or Arab
West, in the words of the eminent Middle Eastern scholar Bernard
Lewis, whether or not Turkey joins the European Union.
"Turkey's exclusion would not do much to prevent the
increasing infiltration of Islamic values into Europe
Nor is Turkey quite so backward economically as some European
opponents of Turkish membership argue. The country's economy
has come a long way since the ratification of its 1963 Association
Agreement with the European Union, when Time magazine described
the country as Europe's "poor sister. At that point, Turkey's
GNP per capita was just $200 a year, two thirds of the country's
inhabitants were illiterate, ten percent were unemployed and
the population was increasing by three percent a year. Turkey
exported virtually nothing except agricultural products and
ran a chronic trade deficit. Turkey today bears no resemblance
to a "poor sister. Its stock market, which did not exist in
1963, is now the largest in the region, and annual GNP per capita
has soared to $3,300. The structure of exports has changed completely,
and Turkey now sells more electrical and electronic goods abroad
than agricultural products. The rate of population increase
has fallen to 1.8 percent a year. While world merchandise trade
increased by 17 percent between 2000 and 2003, Turkish trade
rose by 76 percent. Thanks to its customs union agreement with
the European Union, Turkish customs regulations have to a very
large extent already been harmonized with those of the Union.
While over 50 percent of Turkey's exports today go to Europe,
the customs union has also helped Turkey to become more competitive
in global trade.
"Outside the EU, Turkey would not choose to leave the
West and become an Iranian-style theocracy
The fact that Turkey already has a customs union with the European
Union means that it would not have to make too many changes
in its foreign trade regulations to become an EU member. There
are, however, other areas, such as labor and environmental policies,
where negotiations would be difficult. The economy is far from
being a total success story. Turkey has been struggling with
chronic inflation since the late 1970s. Although the inflation
rate was down to 18.4 percent in 2003, and is expected to fall
still farther in 2004, the continuing fragility of the economy
could oblige the AKP government to seek yet another agreement
with the International Monetary Fund. Despite record tourism
revenue, the current account deficit is expected to reach $14.5
billion, or 4.9 percent of GDP, by the end of 2004, and Turkey
is far from meeting any of the economic criteria for joining
the euro. That, however, need not be an immediate worry, given
that even under the most favorable hypothesis, Turkey is still
many years away from joining the European Union, let alone the
single currency. On the critical issue of the free movement
of labor, Turkey has already declared its readiness to make
concessions to meet the European Union's concerns. There are
currently just over 3.5 million Turks living in the European
Union, 38 percent of whom are unemployed. In Germany, home to
most of the Turks in Europe, the unemployment rate for Turks
is 2.5 times higher than the national level of 9.6 percent,
mostly because of a lack of skills. Under such conditions, even
if Turkish citizens were given the right to move freely in the
European Union, estimates of an influx of between 500,000 and
4 million Turkish workers into the other EU countries are hardly
realistic. Turkey needs support and encouragement to find solutions
to its sociopolitical and economic problems. If enduring structural
changes are to be made, however, they must come from within
- Turkey's problems can be solved only by the Turks themselves.
There is little point in criticizing Turkey for the slow pace
with which it is implementing reforms, because Turkey's problems
are so historically and socially charged that reforms must start
with slow, symbolic steps before they can evolve into dramatic
transformations. The horrified reactions of most Turks to the
terrorist attacks in Istanbul in the autumn of 2003 show that
Turkey has fundamentally chosen the path of modernism and Westernization.
If Turkey failed to join the European Union, the immediate choice
facing the country would not be between becoming a member of
the Western bloc or an Iranian-style theocracy. A Turkey that
remained outside the European Union would not be progressively
overwhelmed by all sorts of radicals including Al Qaeda and
its allies. That is not to deny that Turkey will remain a target
for attack by Islamic militants. The country manifestly defies
the thesis of Osama bin Laden and his followers that Islam,
democracy and separation of church and state in any form cannot
coexist in any country populated predominantly by Muslims. But
that will remain the case whether or not Turkey joins the European
Union. The real choice facing Turkey outside the European Union
would be how far to become a genuinely Western society. It could
become a Western-style democracy that placed no restrictions
on civil society, enforced individual and human rights, and
focused on improving the prosperity of its population. Or it
could become a bulwark between the West and the Arab world with
only a barely acceptable form of democracy. That would be of
concern not just for Turkey, but also for the European Union,
which would have to live with the consequences. It is at this
point in the argument that the question is often raised as to
whether Turkey could be a role model for the rest of the Muslim
world, demonstrating that Islam and democracy need not be incompatible.
U.S. commentators often advance this view as one of the main
reasons for rapid Turkish EU entry. The issue, however, is often
vastly over-simplified. In the first place, most Turks are extremely
reluctant to cast their country as a role model for the Arab
countries of the Middle East, which they associate with extremely
negative qualities such as decline, defeat and unreliability.While
it is true that Turkey is a unique example of a democratic Muslim
nation state, at least with regard to its Islamic neighbors,
Turkey's historical, cultural and national experience is also
quite different from theirs. Turkey's history is far more deeply
intertwined with that of Europe. That is, of course, one of
the reasons why Turkey has been accepted as a candidate for
EU membership.
"Turkey is unlikely to be accepted by its Arab neighbors
as a model of moderate, democratic Islam
It is in fact unlikely that Turkey's experience could ever be
replicated in other parts of the region, or that Arab countries
would try to imitate Turkey. The Arabs have regarded Turkish
culture, and the Turkish version of Islam, as deviant from their
own since the 8th century AD. A successful Turkish version of
moderate, democratic Islam would not be without influence in
the Islamic world, but few Arabs would take kindly to the idea
that they should actually adopt Turkey as a model. Both Turkey's
unique historical experience and Western strategic interests
suggest that the country's destiny lies with Europe. The divergence
between political Islam in Turkey and radical Islam elsewhere
should be clearly under- stood. Both forms of Islam are extremely
modern in their organization, tactics and slogans. But there
is a vital difference. Unlike militant Islam, which chooses
terror and anarchy as its weapons, Turkey's Islamist leaders
have deliberately started to work within the established system.
Turkish Muslims are also the least comfortable with the umma,
or community, understanding of Islam.
A Westernized Turkey that combined the respect of individual
rights with a political Islamist movement that accepted modernism
and the separation church and state might not be accepted as
a role model by the Arab nations of the Middle East. But as
a member of the European Union, such a Turkey might help the
Union to resolve some of its own identity problems.
Ahmet K. Han is a member of the faculty of the Economics and Administrative Department of
Kadir Has University in Istanbul. He is also Executive Adviser to the Turkish Exporters Assembly,
the umbrella organization of Turkey's exporter associations. A regular TV and press commentator,
he is the international relations and political affairs editor of the magazine TURKISHTiME, published
in Turkish and English by the Turkish Exporters Assembly. He was a member of the committee
that prepared a report to the Turkish Economic Congress 2004, The Role of Civil Society and
the Private Sector in Turkey's Relations with the EU.
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