In cooperation with the Paris-based think tank Europe 2020, The
European
Institute organized a wide-ranging debate on the future of Transatlantic
relations
over the next ten to 15 years, together with recommendations for strengthening
links
between the European Union and the United States. The discussion, held
in
Washington on April 5, 2005, took as its starting point a controversial
report,
EU
Foreign Political Vision 2020, based on a series of seven seminars
arranged by Europe 2020 in cooperation with the Foreign Ministries
of France, the Netherlands, Poland, Belgium, Portugal, Britain and
Finland. The exercise, entitled GlobalEurope 2020 II, was intended
to gather the views of influential Europeans on Europe’s future
relations with the rest of the world and discuss the conclusions reached
for each region with representatives of the regions concerned. The
debate summarized below covers
the section of the report dealing with the European Union and North
America.
(The report is available at
http://www.europe2020.org/en/GlobalEurope/Global
Europe1.htm.)
The account begins with a summary of the
Six Key Ideas and
Six
Proposals identified by the report with regard to EU-U.S. relations in the years
ahead, as the
European Union endeavors to establish a common foreign policy, and
continues with extracts from the debate by participants from both sides
of the Atlantic. Although some Americans found much to agree with in
the report, others attacked the proposals as excessively Eurocentric
and inadequate to deal with the global challenges that the European
Union and the United States must tackle in the 21st century. The strong
reactions from many of the American panelists led to a spirited debate.
Discussants
John Van Oudenaren, Chief, European Division, Library of Congress; Klaus-Peter Gottwald, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the Federal
Republic of Germany; Tracy McKibben, Director, European and Eurasian
Affairs, National Security Council; Shaun Donnelly, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic and Business
Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Franck Biancheri, Director
of Studies & Strategy,
Europe 2020; Carlos Westendorp y Cabeza, Ambassador of Spain to the
United States; Karen Volker, Deputy Director, Office of European and
Regional Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Daniel Hamilton, Director,
Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.
Six Key Ideas
1. Following the end of the Cold War and recent Transatlantic crises,
notably over Iraq, Europeans no longer view their relations with the
United States in the same way as they did in the half century following
World War II. Hitherto, three historic pillars common security
challenges, common values and close economic links have supported
the Atlantic relationship. The first two are now in open crisis and
the third is undergoing huge changes.
On the security front, no EU member state would have considered Iraq
a threat to global peace in 2003, had it not been persuaded of the
danger by the United States. The European Union considers terrorism
a symptom of a wide range of global threats, while the United States
sees it as a threat by itself.
As for common values, the European Union sees international law as
fundamental to international relations, while the United States has
recently developed the theory of preemptive war.
Trade and mutual investment remain extremely important, but there are
deep running controversies over subsidies. Even more significantly,
the euro is becoming a reserve currency that is challenging the dollar
and limiting Washington’s capacity to impose its leadership by
monetary means.
2. The European Union is evolving into a political entity, making
the emergence of a common foreign policy inevitable. Washington will
be
obliged to negotiate with the European Union as a whole, rather than
with national governments. The
construction period of the European Union is being succeeded by a period
in which the focus will be on the management and governance of a Union
of 500 million
citizens and 30 nationalities.
3. The Transatlantic relationship will be of paramount importance in
the 21st century, provided the European Union and Washington modify
it to take account of the European Union’s request for a balanced
partnership. Washington will have to understand and respect these European
aspirations in order to safeguard the alliance, but the necessary changes
will not be easy.
4. The United States and the European Union disagree widely on the
efficiency and desirability of multilateralism, and American elites
no longer seem to understand Europe. America’s capacity to understand
the world seems to have diminished
considerably in the last few decades. The U.S. rejection of multilateralism
appears to be the result less of analysis than of incapacity, and of
unwillingness to understand and to master the multilateral dimensions
and institutions of global politics.
While the European public is enthusiastic about the Transatlantic debate,
the U.S. public is rarely exposed to it. But it is indispensable that
Americans appreciate the
political importance of Transatlantic relations. If nothing is done
to promote
common understanding of the problems, the gap between the two sides
of the Atlantic will widen and might become impossible to bridge in
the future.
5. The Transatlantic relationship will probably be the most
important factor
determining EU foreign policy, but it will not be the only one. Transatlantic
relations will have to be based on a common analysis of global problems
and a consensus on their solutions. In addition to the differing analyses
of terrorism, Europeans are greatly concerned by poverty, global warming,
water and energy shortages, and other medium and long term threats
that the United States does not want to address.
6. We need to agree on new rules to govern Transatlantic relations,
and we shall have to educate people to play by them. The Europeans
expect that their “followership” of the past will become “fellowship.” That
is not necessarily to deny American leadership. But the United States
must understand that instead of seeking to impose its will, it should
use its influence to create consensus.
Six Proposals
1. The European Union must make greater efforts to explain the European
Union and discuss its policies throughout the United States. For
instance, a European foundation of Transatlantic relations could
be created that would allocate funds to initiatives and projects,
and the existing network of European centers could be strengthened.
2. We need common tools for analyzing risks and threats and how to
deal with them.
3. Before increasing U.S.-European human exchanges, we should find
out what programs already exist. We can then design plans for improving
relations between U.S., European and national institutions.
4. The European Union should offer programs to train U.S.
leaders and opinion makers in trans-European management models, so
that they
can understand the
complex issues of multilateralism.
5. We must agree on proposals for reforming the United Nations,
first among Europeans and then at Transatlantic level. The aim should
be
for the European Union to speak with one voice through a single representation
in all UN organizations and
institutions, especially the Security Council.
6. The European Union should increase the political visibility of
its representation in the United States and reduce its bureaucratic
image. A good start has been made with the appointment of former
Irish Prime Minister John Bruton to head the EU delegation in Washington,
thus replacing a civil servant with a politician.
The Debate
John Van Oudenaren, Chief, European Division, Library of Congress
This report is an interesting mirror that reflects how Europeans, especially
the
rising generation, see themselves and their place in the world. The six proposals
all have a kind of missionary impulse to them: Europe has the truth and here
is how Americans might be brought to understand it. Of course, it is good to
have more
contact and dialogue, but the focus on bringing the European gospel to the
unbelieving Americans risks overlooking policy differences and understating
their importance.
I am not so sure, for instance, that increasing American awareness of the
European Union will necessarily improve U.S.-European relations. The notion
that to understand the European Union is to love it is just madness. I teach
courses on the European Union at Georgetown University, and students arrive
with a basic, positive proclivity toward Europe. Europe is a nice place. It
is where they go for vacations. Relatives often came from there and so on.
But when I start to explain European
and U.S. positions on specific issues, an element of skepticism often creeps
in. So I
question the idea that this missionary impulse is going to create the basis
for the
positive partnership that the report seeks.
An awful lot of what is written about Transatlantic affairs recycles old clichés
and is not very interesting. But the distinguished historian and foreign policy
expert Walter Russell Mead gets to the point of the policy differences, as
opposed to the missionary, public relations differences. He says the fundamental
difference between the United States and the European positions is about mutual
influence over each other’s policies. He writes in a recent essay, “a
cardinal element in the European position is that for the relationship to be
satisfactory Europe, or at least a critical mass within Europe, must be able
to veto American military adventures under certain circumstances. For the United
States to go ahead with military action in the face of strong European opposition
is unilateralism and is radically unacceptable to many European states.” I
think everyone would pretty much agree with that.
“On the other hand,” he continues, “if European states propose some
global initiative, on the international criminal court, for example, or the
Kyoto protocol, the United States has no legitimate right of veto.” Even
if the United States simply seeks an exemption from such initiatives, it is
a sign of unacceptably unilateral behavior. In other words, “Europe wants
a nonreciprocal veto over American initiatives worldwide.”
For Europeans, partnership often means pushing for policies they see as perfectly
understandable, reasonable and multilateral. But from the point of view of
any U.S. administration, the American public and the Congress that approach
amounts to a sort of nonreciprocal veto.
Walter Russell Mead says a debate is under way in the United States about whether
or not to accept this nonreciprocal veto, whether it is a reasonable request
or not. Americans, he says, are still discussing the value of the mantle of
legitimacy that comes from agreeing with Europe. “The Bush administration,
and behind it a gradually growing proportion of the American public and foreign
policy staff, believes that the mantle is worth much less than Europe wants
for it. Neoconservatives argue that the value is close to zero. Many liberal
internationalists are ready to pay something close to the asking price. Most
American opinion is somewhere in between, with a general tendency since the
Cold War to revise its value estimate slowly downward.” This is a very
brilliant formulation of the issue.
Now, in fairness, the report we are considering is not just a missionary effort.
There is also an element of coercion or pressure. The message is that Europe
has a larger population than the United States; it has the euro; it has the
second biggest
defense spending; everybody else in the world agrees with Europe on multilateralism
and so on. The implication is that if the Americans do not see the light, they
will
be isolated. There are reasons to be a little bit skeptical about this. Europe
has its
problems; the United States has its problems. I doubt that mere pressure is
going to compel Americans to accept the “nonreciprocal veto.” The
debate on multilateralism is growing, but I am not sure that global trends
are running so strongly in Europe’s favor.
As for the bureaucratic nature of the European Commission and its representation
in Washington, it is wonderful that Mr. Bruton has taken charge. I wish him
well. He is a genial Irish politician who can socialize with and win over American
politicians and that is all to the good. But, here again, I think you have
to make a
distinction between substance and presentation. When the European Commission
Delegation in Washington first introduced a website, for example, it listed
all the
issues Americans had to address to get their act together ranging from
the death penalty to violations of trade agreements.
This approach stems from an attitude toward the world that consists in telling
other countries, “Here is the checklist of things that you need to do
to have good
relations with us.” This grows naturally out of the Commission’s
role. Commission officials police the internal implementation of EU policies.
They lay down conditions for EU entry for candidate countries. Then they come
to Washington and adopt the same sort of attitude, saying, in effect, “Here
are the terms when are you Americans going to sign up to them?” And,
of course, international politics just does not work that way.
Klaus-Peter Gottwald, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Europeans have to see things in perspective. Whenever you look around the next
corner, the temptation is to despair and wonder if we are ever going to make
it. But
if you look backward, you see dramatic changes and improvements in European
integration over the last five years, let alone the last 50 years. That encourages
me to believe that Europe is moving forward in historical terms. Short-term
measures of our achievements may go up and down, but the long-term trend in
European relations and in the European integration process has definitely been
positive in recent decades. I see no reason why, in spite of inevitable bumps
in the road, this should not continue. Even the problems we have encountered
in ratifying the European constitution do not mark the end of the road.
There have also been plenty of ups and downs in the Transatlantic relationship
over the last couple of years, but the overall tendency is very clear and very
positive. We are now in a particularly promising mode because both sides of
the Atlantic are convinced that cooperation is the only really promising way
of managing the relationship that we can fight about many issues and
have substantially different views on many questions, but that we can still
find ways to work things out and move forward on issues that we agree are extremely
important.
That seems to me the right approach towards future cooperation between the
United States and Europe. One of the most encouraging developments was President
George Bush’s decision early in his second term to travel not only to
Europe, but to travel to Brussels, and not only to Brussels, but to the headquarters
of the European Union. I cannot praise this initiative highly enough because
it really marks a new step forward in the relationship.
I would also stress the obvious point that without the constant support of
the United States throughout the 50-year history of European integration we
would not be where we are today. We need to acknowledge the great perseverance
with which the United States has always supported the European Union and European
integration.
Clearly, we have to be realistic. Progress sometimes creates new problems.
To the degree that the European Union becomes a more active player on the world
stage, it also may increasingly find itself in different positions from the
United States. So in a way the basic American encouragement of European integration
is creating a partner that may have its own separate policies. What is important
is that this should not
develop into an antagonistic relationship, and I see no reason why it would,
because the only rational way to deal with all the international challenges
that face both our continents is to stick together and to work out our differences.
Tracy McKibben, Director, European and Eurasian Affairs,
National Security Council
I certainly agree that we should focus on our commonalities rather than our
differences, and that is certainly our current approach. But it is obviously
very difficult to gauge where we shall be in 15 or 20 years, because we are
actually in a very different place today than we were six months ago, for example.
Nevertheless, as we continue to work on our relationship, I can only be optimistic
about its future potential.
I also agree that President Bush’s visit to Europe in February was clearly
important in sending the message that we want to work together on the common
global challenges we all face, and especially that we want to work directly
with the European Union. As for differences over the kind of security threat
we face, President Bush has tried to shed new light on the threat in a Transatlantic
context. He has defined the threat as being more generally a threat to freedom
and democracy, which is certainly important to both America and to Europe.
When we look at the issues underlying the European security strategy, it is
clear that there are more common elements in what we are trying to pursue than
there are differences. As we work together, we will have a profoundly positive
effect on the global community. We have a shared responsibility to address
the key challenges, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, the Middle East peace process and wiping out poverty and despair
across the globe. Those are challenges that only can be met by cooperation
between the United States and the European Union.
While the first priority of the United States after the terrorist attacks of
September 11 was obviously to protect the homeland, we have also continued
working to support civil society, to salvage sustainable economic development
and to promote global prosperity. Our commitment to the international community
has not been reduced. And we want the European Union to be a strong partner.
We certainly support
the evolution of the European Union from an economic grouping to a political
and
security entity.
As for supposed differences in American and European values, the United States
also believes in the need for a multilayered approach to global problems that
includes action on the economic, political and social fronts. We obviously
all believe in the
dignity of self-rule, justice and freedom. While there might be differences
about how we tackle those issues, I think those differences will continue to
shrink.
In the economic field, there is continued concern about the effect that trade
disputes will have on Transatlantic relations, and we shall continue to have
such
disputes. But there is a clear focus now on promoting what is already a highly
integrated Transatlantic economy. It is clear that our trade is so enormous
that a
reduction in barriers, and in restrictions on foreign direct investment, is
in the interest of both the United States and Europe. With a clear goal and
motivation to pursue
further integration, our economic concerns will be reduced, while disputes
will
continue to occur. We will use the World Trade Organization to address such
conflicts.
We also have a joint responsibility, as great democracies, to support democratic
reformers and help to build democracy around the world. That obviously requires
looking outside Europe, although that is more of a challenge for Europe than
for the United States, particularly in light of the important issues now confronting
the
European Union. As the European Union grapples with slow economic growth and
the crisis over the ratification of the constitutional treaty, and as it moves
toward its goal of developing a highly competitive economy, it will obviously
be tempted to focus more on its internal affairs. In the Transatlantic relationship,
however, we shall need to pursue a forward and outward-looking strategy to
address our common challenges, such as bringing peace to the Middle East and
concluding trade negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda.
Shaun Donnelly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic
and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State
I find little to disagree with in the major recommendations of the report,
but I
am disturbed by some other elements that might distract attention from these
very
pragmatic suggestions. I am troubled by the suggestion that “many in
Washington don’t feel concerned about dangers, such as poverty, epidemics,
global warming and energy shortages.”
We may have different approaches to these problems, but we certainly feel
concerned. We are the major donor in fighting HIV/AIDS and most other epidemics.
We are looking for our European friends to step up and join us. We are concerned
about energy shortages. We want to work with Europe. We have differences about
some of the climate and environmental issues, but we want to work constructively.
It is wrong to say that somehow the United States does not care about these
issues.
I am also disappointed that the report conveys the impression that Europe is
always multilateral and the United States always unilateral. We may disagree
on
certain strategies, but whether in the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank, the United
Nations or NATO, we believe we act multilaterally.
On the economic side, there are areas in which Europe seems to us to be acting
unilaterally, for example when it adopts its own chemicals directive or sets
standards for so-called geographical indications which have huge implications
for the rest of
the world. The same goes for the European Union’s espousal of the precautionary
principle, for example in food regulations, which we do not consider a scientifically
well-founded solution.
The suggestion that Europeans see terrorism as a symptom, not a threat, also
represents a fundamental difference. We see it as a threat. If you do not see
it as a threat, then that is something that we need to keep working on. I am
not saying that it is only a short term threat. It is a medium and long term
threat as well despite the comment that the United States somehow does
not want to address medium and long term issues.
I was also struck by the suggestion that Europeans see a need to educate American
elites to understand the complex concepts of multilateralism. This seems to
suggest that there is only one legitimate view, the multilateral view not
that there are two equally valid, though different views in the United States
and Europe and that the problem is that the Americans have not yet
come to understand it. We haven’t quite gotten it. And it’s your
task to explain it again until we understand and see the one correct view.
I am troubled that some of these points will cause the report to be not so
well received by at least some people in the United States.
Klaus-Peter Gottwald
I find it quite interesting that Europeans today are being reproached by Americans
for overly missionary zeal, whereas for so many decades it was the other way
around. Until very recently, many Europeans claimed that the missionary zeal
of the
Americans might sometimes be part of the problem.
It seems to me that the central problem in the relationship is not American
strength, but European weakness. This is not a new discovery, but I think it
needs to be repeated. The failure of Europeans in many cases to get their act
together is part of the reason why we are unable to do some of the things we
would like to do, while the Americans are able to act. So we Europeans have
to concentrate our efforts on seeing how we can improve our way of operating.
We should look at concrete issues on which we should cooperate. Take China,
for example. Neither the United States nor the Europeans have a patent recipe
on how to deal with Beijing. Why shouldn’t we get together and discuss
it and maybe offer some strategies, instead of suspiciously reproaching each
other?
Franck Biancheri, Director of Studies & Strategy, Europe 2020
The report does not claim that Europe is perfect far from it. So there
is
nothing like a missionary vision here. But the report does say that over the
next 15 to 20 years we face an erosion of the human basis of the Transatlantic
relationship. If we go on like this, there will be fewer and fewer people on
either side who are able to
discuss with each other, to understand each other and to work together. In
the meantime, the two sides are becoming bigger and bigger, and more and more
estranged from each other in many ways.
But we can act now to prevent this, just as France and Germany did in creating
the close Franco-German relationship. We need to develop strong relations among
civil societies, universities and members of the younger generation if
not, we are going to end up with a shortage of capacity just to understand
each other.
Over the past 40 or 50 years, the European elites were mostly trained and
educated in the United States, but this is no longer the case. Ninety percent
of the kind of students who used to study overseas now study in the European
Union. So this
report warns that the conditions defining the Transatlantic policies of the
past
50 years are changing fast, and if we do not take this into account, we shall
make big mistakes.
In Europe, Transatlantic relations are no longer simply a matter for the elite.
They are increasingly the concern of political parties, public opinion and
the media, and the current EUU.S. relationship is not equipped to deal
with this development.
We are reaching a critical situation. Opinions of the United States in the
European Union today are not very positive. As the European Union becomes more
democratic, citizens will play a stronger role in shaping EU policies. If these
trends in public
opinion do not change, EU leaders will not be able to resist the anti-American
views of citizens, who are exerting increasing influence over their governments.
Tracy McKibben
One of the problems with this discussion is that we are talking about a report
that reflected European public opinion at the time it was written. But the
debate is
different now from six months ago, and it will be different again in six months’ time.
One aspect of the Transatlantic relationship we have to deal with is the question
of whether or not the focus should continue to be about Europe or about the
United States and Europe looking outward to the rest of the world, such as
the Middle East and Africa.
I hoped that we had moved beyond the issue of the recognition of the importance
of Europe and its integration. We need more of a debate about how we are going
to deal with common global challenges, which necessarily means going further
than
simply focusing on Europe itself. One of our shortcomings is that we have not
made the American and European publics aware of the extent of the work that
we have done together. The U.S. government is now trying to use diplomacy to
highlight the
successes we have had in Transatlantic cooperation.
Carlos Westendorp y Cabeza, Ambassador of Spain to the United States
The European Union has to know where it wants to go, which will be basically
in one of two directions. Either we deepen the integration process throughout
the
European Union, or in a part of it, or we stop the process and stay where we
are. And, of course, the bicycle theory suggests that if you stop pedaling
forward, you may fall over.
Two main factors will influence the outcome an internal factor, which
is the will of the Europeans themselves, and an external factor, which is the
influence of other actors in the international arena, particularly the United
States.
It is very clear that global challenges need global responses. But even though
they realize that, there is no consensus among the Europeans about the course
that the
European project should take. The problem goes beyond the current difficulties
over the ratification of the EU constitutional treaty and concerns the will
of the European Union to take decisions in foreign and defense policy.
The answers to international challenges are not necessarily going to be similar
on both sides of the Atlantic, because the views and interests of the European
Union and the United States will not necessarily coincide. Their objectives
may be the same, but sometimes they will differ over the means and tactics
to attain these objectives.
In the short term, however, the European Union will concentrate more on its
integration process, and it is not clear that it will be able to act unanimously.
The Iraq war revealed a divide between the United States and some EU members,
but the rift within the European Union was even deeper. That constituted a
serious warning about the future of European integration. It is unrealistic
to think that we shall not face similar situations in future. So the main challenge
is the internal factor whether Europe is going to have the will to
push on toward further integration.
Turning to the external factor, it is important to remember that European integration
has only been possible thanks to the security net that the United States has
provided through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. What would happen
if the Americans were to decide to withdraw from European defense? I am not
talking about the United States actually leaving NATO, but weakening its cohesion
by relying on coalitions of the willing, rather than the alliance as a whole.
That would be a serious blow to European integration. The United States is
still indispensable, because if the United States withdrew from European defense,
the EU member states would have to react by increasing their defense budgets
in an uncoordinated and ineffective manner, or by seeking bilateral special
relationships with
the United States. Then there would be the risk of a European Union of so-called
concentric circles, or variable geometry, which would face the same kind of
turbulence. That, of course, would have even more serious effects because such
a Europe would not be equipped to cope with the global challenges of the future.
If it has the will, the European Union can act very efficiently in two or three
areas, such as Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa. But it is absolutely
necessary for the European Union and the United States to act together in other
areas, such as fighting terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and dealing with new international actors like China and
India.
What should we expect from Europe if the integration process stops? If the
cause is a lack of internal political will, the European Union will continue
under the
provisions of the Treaty of Nice. With 30 members, it will be unable to take
decisions jointly, and a series of ad hoc coalitions will form in different
political areas. If the
integration process is stopped because of the external factor, the consequences
will be different. If America decided to loosen the bonds, it would probably
provoke a
turning inward in Europe and the nationalistic tendencies of member states
would be reinforced. The enlargement process would continue, but the bonds
of integration would loosen and Europe would be unable to become a relevant
actor in the international sphere.
Despite all of these dangers, however, the Transatlantic relationship will
still
be dominant. The United States and the European Union will constitute a de
facto directorate in world affairs. We represent the democratic paradigm and have
the strength, the wealth, and the legitimacy to play this role.
I would add that we shall need not only a public relations operation in the
United States to help Americans understand the European Union, but also a similar
campaign to help Europeans understand the United States. And while Europeans
may be unclear about the purpose of the European Union, Americans know what
their country is about.
Karen Volker, Deputy Director, Office of European and Regional Affairs,
U.S. Department of State
I do think that the United States has gained an increasing appreciation of
the
importance of the EU project and what it means to Europe, and that this will
help the United States and Europe to communicate with each other. I think that
some of the comments made by President Bush during his trip to Europe in February
go a long way toward alleviating some European suspicions about American policies
and intentions, which are generally unfounded but which we need to address.
The report we are discussing is absolutely right to say that the European Union
should come up with a comprehensive common strategy for its relations with
other countries in its neighborhood. That would make it very clear to people
outside the European Union what their aspirations can be; and it would make
it clear to the United States which countries we can push the European Union
to accept as potential members and which we can’t.
More generally, I was surprised how far I disagreed with all the key ideas
of the
report and yet agreed with the six proposals. I would add, however, that the
proposals emphasize the need to educate Americans about Europe, whereas the
first half of the report suggests that there needs to be an equal emphasis
on educating Europeans about American perceptions and American policy.
The United States is working with the European Union in a large number of areas,
publicly and behind the scenes, despite all the differences that make their
way into the headlines. This is happening most concretely in areas where even
a few months ago one would not have thought that we would be working together for
instance in Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Sudan. Even during the difficulties we
experienced over the Iraq war, the United States and Europe still found a way
to work together on the most
important issues.
Daniel Hamilton, Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations,
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University.
I agree that there is a need for better education in the United States about
the
European Union and to build more personal contacts between Europeans and Americans.
But I am not sure that this report will get us there. A principal problem with
this
report is its primary focus on differences between “Europe” and “America,” as
if public and elite opinion on each side of the Atlantic were quite unified.
This is simply not the case. The report ignores the huge differences that exist
within the United States and Europe on most of the topics it seeks to address.
The result is a rather skewed Strengthening the Transatlantic Relationship.
Yes, we are in disarray. When has this alliance ever been in array?
This is a
perennial debate. Merely asserting differences does not make the case
for divorce. It may be more productive to look at some basic trends
that are driving change. The first, of course, is the end of the Soviet
threat. Unfortunately, many conclude that
because this threat is gone we can afford to have more differences.
I think that is a wrong conclusion, but it certainly provides a new
context for the relationship.
A second major driver of change is what I and others call the two 9/11s.
November 9, the day the Berlin Wall came down, is 9/11 on European
calendars. The earthquake unleashed by the momentous events of that
time is still shaking the continent.
Creating a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace with itself is
a historic, positive
opportunity but it is immensely preoccupying when seen from
abroad. We had our own 9/11. Our differences in this regard have less
to do with peculiar “American” or “European” values
and more to do with the fact that catalytic events in the United States
have forced us to reexamine the kind of world we face. We are not conducting
a good discussion across the Atlantic about how these two 9/11s have
shaped perceptions and how they sometimes pull us in different directions.
Another trend, globalization, is not pulling us apart, it is bringing
us together. Our societies are integrating more than ever before, and
the end of the Cold War has, in fact, accelerated the trend. The deep
integration of our economies and our societies, driven by strong forces
of Transatlantic investment, continued to accelerate in the first four
years of the Bush administration, and it will go on doing so unless
there is some other major event. So while we hear assertions that we
are drifting apart, there are also counterintuitive trends that are
bringing us together.
Then there is the global aspect. Ninety percent of the transatlantic
agenda during the Cold War consisted of the challenge of stabilizing
Europe. Transatlantic relations were about the stability of the European
continent. Today that does not account for 90 percent of the agenda.
We each are now facing global problems beyond the European continent.
The challenge is whether we can adapt our mechanisms and our way of
thinking to the kind of partnership we need to adjust to that reality.
So, rather than focusing on the stability of Europe, we are facing
a three-fold agenda, with each element fairly well-balanced in importance.
One is still Europe,
and particularly the wider Europe that is being referred to as the
European Union’s “neighborhood.” Most of the countries
in that area become really upset at being
referred to as part of Europe’s “neighborhood.” They
do not consider themselves neighbors of Europe; they think they are
also Europe. And they want to rejoin this broader, wider Europe.
In fact, the earthquake triggered by the fall of the Berlin Wall continues
to shake the continent today. It is not developments in Western Europe
that are shaking the continent, but events in countries like Ukraine
and Georgia. And I am not sure that many of my Western European colleagues
comprehend what is still going on to their East.
Today, with regard to the countries farther East, we are essentially
at the same point that we were about 15 years ago with respect to Central
and Eastern Europe. The challenge is whether we are prepared to do
again together what we did then: to set out a path by which this next
tier of countries can become more fully integrated into our overall
community and its core institutions.
A simple neighborhood policy will not be enough, because the greatest
foreign policy success in the European Union’s history has been
enlargement. The leverage of enlargement has created massive changes
throughout the European continent, far more than a European neighborhood
policy can achieve. The real challenge for the European Union is whether
it is going to continue the enlargement process or build new barriers
against countries that are changing the way they live.
A related issue is whether we are prepared to tackle the festering
conflicts that still plague that region, which some are reluctant to
do primarily because of their concerns about their relations with Moscow.
Over the 15 to 20 year period we are talking
about, however, we shall see the end of the post Soviet-space. While
many in the West still talk about a post-Soviet space, the people in
the region do not they are trying to create their own space
and join a “European space.” For various reasons, many
are
still reluctant to engage Moscow more straightforwardly. But it cannot
be in Russia’s interest to have a zone of instability on its
borders. We need to apply the same
argument to the regions closer to Russia that we did to the Central
and Eastern
European countries to justify their inclusion in NATO and the European
Union.
Another aspect of the European element of the agenda is a more supportive
U.S. approach to European integration. There has been a fairly ambivalent
debate in the United States over the last few years about whether we
really support European
integration. But it is not just the fact of integration that Europeans
should expect Americans to support the question is the nature
of that integration. Does it create the kind of partner we need? Does
it stabilize the European continent? Does it
provide a prosperous space and open markets for American goods and
products? This is the kind of integration that Americans will support.
If the European Union goes in that direction I hope you will find American
support. If it does not, you will find
concerns. I think we need to be much more straightforward on our side
of the Atlantic that the right kind of deeper integration is definitely
in America’s interest.
The second big agenda item is beyond Europe the global agenda.
This is
certainly going to be prominent in our discussions over the next 15
years. Unfortunately this is the part of the agenda on which we usually
disagree with each other. These issues have been peripheral to Transatlantic
relations in the past, which is why our disagreements not really caused
great ruptures, but we now see how difficult it can be. There are some
ways we can connect here. The Broader Middle East is really
the challenge of the next Transatlantic generation. Are we going to
tackle the trans-formation of that vast area together, working with
the people of the region? It is the region in which unsettled conflicts
really threaten Western prosperity and security, and it is unhooked
from the global economy. Many millions of people there are without
hope. Transformation is not just driven by idealism; we also have a
hardheaded
interest in engaging this region.
The conflict over the European Union’s plan to lift its arms
embargo against China is a classic example of how not to conduct a
strategic dialogue on global issues. We have had a Transatlantic agenda
for ten years now that provides for that kind of dialogue, but the
forum we have set up for ourselves prevents us from having the deep
discussions we need, and the rift over the arms embargo is just one
consequence of that. Nor have we yet perfected our mechanisms for cooperating
on issues like the Doha Development Agenda, the World Trade Organization
and development aid.
The third point on the agenda is that we really need to spend more
time on the
relationships between our societies and our economies. Reducing Transatlantic
relations to the daily agenda between Washington, Brussels and other
European
capitals is to miss the depth and opportunity presented by the ties
between our
nations. For example, business leaders and representatives of American
states and
European regions have created networks that ignore the issues that
national capitals think are important. Wider recognition that both
our societies face very similar issues would provide the Transatlantic
relationship with a different and stronger human foundation than does
a narrow focus on foreign policy differences.
Of course, we have some differences, but we must look at the changes
in the broader world. Europe and the United States represent about
10 percent of the world’s population. The other 90 percent is
also globalizing and changing in the same timeframe. The United States
and the European Union have the two systems that are most like each
other. If we cannot come together on issues that divide us, how can
we possibly deal with all the other systems that are not like ours?
Either we are going to spend our time focusing on narrow differences
between us or we are going to build a new way of working together to
deal with the rise of China, the transformation of the Broader Middle
East and a host of other global issues. That is the challenge. And
we shall not rise to the challenge if we keep focusing on marginal
kinds of issues rather than the really vast agenda we have in front
of us.
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