Popular concerns about immigration, and the problems of
integrating immigrants, are a common thread in all the most difficult
challenges currently facing the European Union. Although immigration
and integration are rarely make-or-break issues, they are having significant
impacts on the debates over the proposed EU constitutional treaty,
the Union’s recent and future enlargement, its demographic problems
and the war on terror.
In the French referendum on the EU’s constitutional treaty, for
example, many No voters were apparently motivated by fears that the
constitution and EU enlargement threatened to allow in significant
numbers of new immigrants who would steal French jobs and undermine
the country’s welfare system. Most Europeans are loath to accept
the argument that many more immigrants may be needed to support the
continent’s aging population. What is more, many among the population
at large fear that increased immigration could provide an entry route
for terrorists. Many of these fears are exaggerated,
misplaced, or based on misconceptions. But the rise of these issues
on the political agenda means that politicians can no longer afford
to ignore them.
In the UK, for instance, a Mori opinion poll in May 2005 the month in
which Tony Blair’s Labour Party won its third general election but lost
large numbers of Parliamentary seats showed that voters thought immigration/integration/race
relations was the third most important national issue after crime/vandalism and
the National Health Service. By July 2005, just two months later, immigration
had risen
to second place, behind defense/foreign affairs/international terrorism.
Discontent with both the lack of
integration of existing immigrants, and with inadequate controls on new immigrant
admissions, have arisen largely
because politicians long ignored both citizens’ anxieties and the intricacies
of the policy issues involved. Rightly or wrongly, popular concerns across
Europe, about integration in particular, are likely to increase following the
July 2005 terrorist bombings in London, the 2 November 2004 murder of Dutch filmmaker
Theo van Gogh by an Islamic extremist, and the 11 March 2004 bombings in Madrid.
“In some countries, right wing, anti-immigration parties have achieved
considerable
success”
It would be wrong, however, to make generalizations about the whole of
Europe. In many countries, the levels of public concern and the facts of immigration
differ. So do the responses by
governments, their degrees of success in dealing with the problem and the
electoral consequences.
In some countries, right-wing, anti-immigration parties that have emerged in
response to the public’s anxieties have achieved considerable success.
Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of France’s
National Front, did well in Presidential and local elections in the 1990s and
then shocked much of the country
by reaching the run-off round in the Presidential elections of 2002, beating
the Socialist leader Lionel Jospin, before finally losing to President Jacques
Chirac.
In the Danish elections of February 2005, the nationalistic People’s Party,
led by Pia Kjaersgaard, won 24 seats in
the 179-seat Parliament, confirming its position as the country’s third
largest party. Although not part of the ruling coalition, the People’s
Party generally supports the government, in exchange for the adoption of some
of the policies the party favors, such as tighter controls on immigration.
Other populist, anti-immigrant
parties have acquired political influence despite electoral ups and downs including
the quasi-separatist Northern League, led by Umberto Bossi in Italy, the Vlaams
Blok (now Vlaams Belang or Flemish Interest), led by Philip
Dewinter in Belgium and the right wing Freedom Party, until recently led by Jörg
Haider in Austria.
The UK and the Netherlands have followed somewhat different patterns. In the
UK, the British National Party has not fared at all well nationally although
it has scored some minor
victories in local government elections in areas such as Oldham in the North
of England, where there have been severe racial tensions. Instead, the mainstream
parties have competed in showing toughness on immigration to win public favor.
The opposition Conservative Party raised the migration problem in the 2005 election,
even though it had failed to gain traction on the issue in the previous 2001
general election. Mr. Blair
responded with an agenda for tightening border controls and combating illegal
immigration, and a major speech on the complexity of decisions to permit greater
legal immigration and deal with refugee issues through asylum and resettlement
in the UK. Analysts differ
on which party won the immigration
argument.
In the Netherlands, an anti-immigration position has been adopted by some of
the mainstream parties and by new parties that are not particularly far to the
right in other policy areas. Pim Fortuyn, a novice Dutch politician though long-time
popular commentator, who was outspokenly anti-immigration, and was assassinated
by an animal rights activist days before elections in May 2002, could not correctly
be classified as an extreme right-wing politician.
In response to Mr. Fortuyn’s
immense popularity among voters, the mainstream Christian Democratic and Liberal
parties, which have led a governing coalition since 2003, have adopted significant
elements of his proposed agenda. A new party led by former
Liberal Party member Geert Wilders, who also strongly opposes Turkish EU entry,
as well as Mr. Fortuyn’s own party, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn, have tried to
hold on to his plain-speaking, vote-winning anti-immigration credentials, but
the popularity of both has been waning
according to opinion polls.
The way in which concerns about integration and policies regarding immigration
generally have been taken on by the mainstream in these two countries says a
lot about the concerns themselves and the new importance attached to them.
Mr. Fortuyn argued that there should be no new immigration until those already
legally in the country had been fully integrated. Immigrants are broadly viewed
as having failed to
integrate when they have little or no command of the language of the country
in which they live; when they remain
unemployed and live off welfare benefits; and when they maintain their own
cultural and social traditions and reject those of the society around them.
Additional popular concerns, common in left wing circles, are that
immigrants will take away jobs, particularly in the unskilled and low-skill
sectors, and become a drain on welfare funds and social services. Anti-immigration
sentiment is by no means a monopoly of the political right.
Dutch politicians inspired by Mr. Fortuyn’s popularity have been trying
to introduce linguistic and cultural tests for immigrants, and to require immigrants
seeking to enter the Netherlands to marry residents to learn some Dutch and show
openness to Dutch culture before getting a visa. These measures have run into
opposition from vocal human rights groups, and legal barriers, and few of them
have become law.
“Anti-immigration sentiment is by no means a monopoly of the political
right”
The basis of Mr. Fortuyn’s popular approach was the idea that the Netherlands
is “full.” The Netherlands is one of the most densely populated countries
in the world, and second only to Malta in the European Union. At the end of 2004,
just over 19 percent of the total
population of 16.3 million was of
non-Dutch origin. Roughly half this
figure was accounted for by first generation immigrants, the other half by
second or third generation immigrants, frequently born as Dutch citizens. The
total non-Dutch origin population is also roughly equally split between people
of Western and non-Western origin. The largest immigrant group is Turkish.
Since immigration became a major issue in the Netherlands, and the debate on
new restrictions gained global attention, the actual number of immigrants, including
asylum-seekers, has dropped significantly. Both Dutch
nationals and previous immigrants have started to leave the country. Population
growth in the Netherlands has slowed dramatically net immigration maintained
its growth for several years,
but since 2004 there has been net
emigration. The country’s fertility rate fell well below the population
replacement rate in the 1980s, although it has since slightly revived. It remains
to be seen whether the recent trend of net
emigration and slowing population growth will continue.
“Among the problems are the lack of open, honest debate and poor public
access
to information”
In the UK, the fertility rate is also below the replacement level so
population growth relies on net immigration. Nevertheless, the Mori poll of May
2005 showed that 58 percent of the population wanted to see tougher immigration
controls. At the same time, 68 percent
either strongly agreed or tended to agree that immigrants make Britain more open
to new ideas and cultures. Thirty-three percent strongly agreed or tended to
agree that immigrants contributed to a rising crime rate and 39 percent saw immigration
as bad for the economy.
These numbers hint at the confusion that reigns in the UK and in many other European
countries regarding immigration. Another poll, in April 2005 for the
Evening
Standard showed that 65
percent of British respondents thought the government was not honest about the
scale of immigration. This followed Conservative Party complaints that the public
had not been consulted about
the Labour government’s policy of
increasing immigration in certain
sectors to satisfy labor demands.
There had, indeed, been no serious public debate on the subject, in contrast
to Germany where there was significant discussion of changes in the immigration
law to allow the admission of highly skilled workers in 2004. The British
government had not hidden the
information entirely. It is just that the British public tends not to look at
the Home Office website, and the media had not seen it as a story until the Conservatives
made it an election issue.
Among the problems clouding
discussions of immigration policy throughout Europe today are the lack of open,
honest debate and poor public
access to information. The need either to accept immigration or to make other
major policy changes tends to polarize the discussion, but also to confuse it.
Since the UN Population Division
reported in 2000 that Europe would need some 150 million immigrants by 2025 to
sustain economic growth and prosperity, there has been widespread recognition
of three key, but potentially contradictory, “facts.”
The first of these is that immigration on such a huge scale is not going to happen,
because Europe’s citizens would not accept it. The second is that even
if
immigration levels were increased, it would be too little too late at this stage.
The third is that alternative measures will be necessary, including longer
working hours, later retirement and reforms in national pension systems. The
third option is as unpalatable as high levels of immigration for most
Europeansbut at some point something will have to give.
The European dilemma contrasts sharply with the situation in the United States.
America also needs immigration for demographic reasons, but is broadly prepared
to accept it. While there is some resistance to immigration in the United States,
it does not seem to be as strong or widespread as in Europe. In the United States,
the notion of being “a country of immigrants” is deep-seated, whereas
on the other side of the Atlantic there is a lasting notion of the cultural homogeneity
of nations, developed over the centuries by the people who have lived in them.
Although there have been centuries of European migratory movements, as
a result of wars, for example, or for
economic reasons, until recently
migrants have usually blended in with the culture and traditions of their new
home countries. The new wave of immigrants, from North Africa, Africa, Turkey
and the Middle East, are much more
easily identifiable than their predecessors, many of whom came from elsewhere
in Europe.
Another important difference between the United States and Europe that is particularly
relevant in the context
of the war on terror is the degree of
secularism in the two societies. Active participation in organized religion is
strong in the United States, and there is acceptance of the expression of faith,
including the expectation that the roughly one percent of Americans who are Muslims
will practice their religion in various ways.
Europe has generally become
increasingly secular in recent decades,
although it has remained culturally
attached to its Christian roots. While participation in organized religious
services is slowly rising again in many European countries, it remains low. About
4.5 percent of the EU population is Muslim, with France having the largest Muslim
minority at 5 million (8.5 percent of the population). The active practice of
religion is higher in this group than among Europeans more broadly.
For some Europeans, the simple fact of practicing a religion at all puts a
person outside the mainstream. As Islam is increasingly tainted by the acts of
groups claiming to be or portrayed as Muslim fundamentalists, even regular religious
worship and the following of dress codes related to the Islamic faith may appear
more dangerous. Thus the wearing of headscarves by Muslim schoolgirls, for example,
has come to
be seen as one of the key indicators of integration policies gone wrong, and
has been the subject of severe political
tensions in France.
“While participation in religious services is slowly rising in many European
countries,
it remains low”
This would seem to indicate that, even if for some Europeans new immigration
is a major concern, the biggest problems are actually the integration of immigrants
and their descendants,
and the roles of race and religion in
European societies. The Dutch were shocked when Mohammed Bouyeri, the man who
killed Theo van Gogh, was found to have been born and brought up in the Netherlands,
with dual Dutch and Moroccan nationality. Dutch statistics and popular discourse
use a technical term for “non-native” to refer to Mr. Bouyeri, along
with all other descendants of post-1950s immigrants. But what was originally
a purely descriptive classification has become a term of abuse, from which only
descendants of white, western immigrants are likely to escape.
“It is clear that in
the Netherlands multiculturalism, with its emphasis on the tolerance of difference,
has failed”
It is clear that in the Netherlands multiculturalism, with its emphasis on the
tolerance of difference to fashion a harmonious new cultural mosaic, has failed.
What is not clear, however, five years after the debate over multiculturalism
started, is whether the attempts now being undertaken to assimilate the
immigrants of the last four decades are working. These efforts include insisting
that immigrants speak better Dutch, find work or otherwise blend into society,
and encouraging the native Dutch population to be more receptive to them.
In the UK, meanwhile, it is still not clear how policies and attitudes toward
immigrants will change in the aftermath of the terrorist bombings in London.
There have been incidents of revenge
attacks on Muslims, particularly Pakistanis and people mistakenly believed
to belong to these groups (including Sikhs) just as there were in the
Netherlands following Mr. van Gogh’s murder.
The model of integration in the UK, however, has been different from that in
the Netherlands. The British approach has been based on improving race
relations, permitting diversity and
encouraging more self-reliance among the immigrants, rather than attempting to
hold their hands, as the Dutch have done in the past. The British have
hitherto believed that they have been more successful than some other countries
in creating an integrated societya perception that will surely now be challenged.
In order to deal with citizens’concerns about immigration and integration, politicians need to pay much greater
attention to determining the type of society and culture their countries
actually want and to deciphering the sorts of humanitarian admissions their citizens
want to permit, even if they are in principle opposed to new immigration. Political
leaders will have to think much more seriously about how to go about integrating
immigrants. But some of the most important questions of all and the ones
most difficult for European politicians have to be about the fundamental
structure of their welfare states.
Only the tip of the iceberg has been sighted so far. Populations have found a
voice on immigration and integration, but not a clear or unanimous voice, and
many of the opinions expressed are
inconsistent with the real facts about
the numbers of immigrants, their employment and their success in learning languages.
If European governments are to craft more successful immigration policies, they
will have to be more open with
information about levels of immigration and the reasons for legal immigration
programs, and work to gain the public’s trust. The UK government’s
immigration program, targeted at specific
economic sectors, is perhaps the most sensible policy approach to immigration
in Europe today, but the absence of
public consultation and information very nearly undermined it.
It will be hard for Europeans to work out better methods of integration. If integration
is working anywhere worldwide, it seems to be working best in the United States
and Canada. The U.S. model essentially of having no federal integration
policy other than for resettled refugees is not workable in European
welfare states.
The idea that legal, or even in some cases illegal, residents of a country would
be excluded from the full range of nationally available welfare benefits,
including schooling, healthcare and
income support, is politically untenable in Europe. Canada might offer a better
model, as its welfare structure is more like that of Europe, if less extensive.
Like the United States, however, and unlike Europe, Canada also has a culture
historically based on immigration and the
encouragement and acceptance of
citizenship through naturalization.
Europe is only just awakening to the extent of the problems it faces on new immigration
and, in particular, on immigrant integration. For the short-term, the most that
can be expected of
Europe’s leaders is to clarify the problems experienced by their societies
to which policy answers are needed. Those answers are only likely to emerge over
the medium to long-term. The immigration and integration issue is no longer dormant,
and can no longer be ignored. The question is: Can Europe do what is necessary,
culturally, politically and economically, to create an opportunity out of this
challenge?
If political leaders fail in this task, they will find it increasingly hard to
convince public opinion that the
European Union should be further
enlarged, allowing free movement to ever more EU citizens, that large numbers
of immigrants may be needed to swell the European workforce and that governments
have a firm grip on the fight against terror or even that the
European Union itself can be trusted to deal with all these challenges.
Joanne van Selm is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Migration Policy Institute
in Washington DC. She is also a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Migration
Studies at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and co-editor of the
Journal of Refugee Studies (Oxford University Press). She has a Ph.D. in International
Relations from the University of Kent in the UK and has
previously worked on migration issues at the European Commission. Jolanta Khan
assisted in
researching this article.
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