One of the most important changes taking place in Europe in recent
years has been the birth of a European public opinion. Although this
is among the continent’s most spectacular developments, it is
one of the least studied and most underestimated phenomena on the political
scene. It is also ironic that the reasons for the emergence of this
new European public opinion have nothing to do with Europe per se,
and it is worth reflecting on them as Europe undergoes a new kind of
identity crisis following the rejection of the proposed EU constitution
in the French and Dutch referendums.
The first stirrings of Europe-wide opinion followed the terrorist attacks
on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. Across the entire
continent a chill ran through the spines of all Europeans. Even the
rather anti-American French newspaper
Le Monde carried an editorial
declaring: “We are all Americans.”
In an unprecedented, collective
expression of sympathy, a minute of
silence was observed from the West of Ireland to the Eastern border
of Poland and from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. That was an event
that had never happened in thousands of years of
history. And yet, as if it had already
become a tradition, another Europe-wide minute of silence was held
the day after the terrorist bombing of the Madrid transit system on
March 11, 2004.
The second trigger for the emergence of an overall European public
opinion was the war in Iraq. Although not unanimously, the vast majority
of the European public was united for the first time against
the war. Europe was divided in two, not into the New and Old Europe
as identified by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, but between
the
Europe of the people, which was massively opposed to the war, and the
Europe of the governments, which was divided. Even in countries where
governments officially supported military intervention (the majority
of the 25 EU member states), large sections of public opinion disagreed.
It is important to remember the sources of European public opinion
in order to understand where it now stands. If European opinion is
to be
interpreted correctly, it must also be
recognized that Europeans and Americans often have opposite perceptions
of the same situation and different spontaneous reactions to it. The
wave of
European sympathy for the United States after 9/11, for instance, is
now considered to have led to such a misunderstanding, with relatively
serious consequences. Most Europeans felt so close to America in their
grief that they saw the terrorist attacks as a universal crime. As
a result, the United States was perceived as an
integral part of a universe encompassing all peaceful nations.
It seemed natural, therefore, rapidly to activate Article 5 of the
NATO Charter which stipulates that an armed attack against one or more
of the Allies “shall be considered an attack against them all.” From
their vantage point, by contrast, U.S. leaders and a large part of
the American public saw 9/11 as a unique act of modern warfare on the
territory of the United States and an unprecedented demonstration of
American vulnerability. To Americans, these extraordinary circumstances
justified exceptional responses, with regard both to military action
and to the administration of justice on terrorists.
While Europeans continue to see the United States as part of the world,
the United States tends to see itself as
special. This difference explains why
Europeans so deeply resented Washington’s disregard of their
act of solidarity in NATO. Europeans found it hard to understand that
the U.S. government considered the attacks a singular threat to America’s
national existence that had to be handled by the United States itself.
Now that Europeans use this misunderstanding to explain the difficulties
with Washington encountered over the last two years, they find themselves
thrown off balance by the argument advanced by the second Bush Administration that
Europe is targeted by the same threat and should therefore share the
burden of the war on terrorism.
“Europeans and Americans often have opposite perceptions of the
same situation and different spontaneous reactions to it”
Europeans and Americans also
differed in their interpretations of the rationale for President George
W. Bush’s trip to Europe immediately after his
second inauguration. President Bush’s visit, in the wake of what
Washington considered successful elections in Iraq, was based on the
notion that, despite some setbacks, the war in Iraq had produced good
results and justified more Transatlantic cooperation, including help
from the allies in reconstructing the country.
A number of Europeans, on the other hand, saw the Presidential visit
as a modern version of the famous
11th century trip by King Henry IV
of Germany to Canossa to beg pardon from Pope Gregory VII, an event
that symbolized the submission of secular power to the Church. (In
the modern version, interestingly, the deeply religious commander of
the West’s dominant armed forces was seen as apologizing to secular
and much militarily weaker allies.) According to this interpretation,
President Bush’s trip reflected an acknowledgement that his previous
policies had failed, with regard both to Europe and to dealing with
terrorism. In fact, however, Washington was simply considering U.S.
national interest from a new perspective, accepting the need to repair
the Transatlantic relationship in order to generate more support for
the dangerous and costly operations it was conducting in Iraq and elsewhere.
“U.S. strategy may ironically have been undercut by the French ‘No’ to
the European constitutional treaty”
Another aspect of President Bush’s visit was perceived very differently
on
either side of the Atlantic. A good number of Europeans and Americans
expressed relief at President Bush’s recognition that the European
Union was playing an increasing role in foreign policy but
not, however, for the same reasons. Senior European diplomats and journalists
viewed Washington’s acceptance of the European Union’s
importance as an admission of the failure of U.S. efforts during the
previous two years to create divisions between France and Germany.
Some Americans, on the other hand, saw the move as an alternative policy
for limiting the influence of France and Germany. The idea was that
by dealing with the European Union as a whole, Washington would be
lumping Paris and Berlin together in a group containing a majority
of other nations more favorable to U.S. policies. If this was indeed
the U.S. strategy, it has ironically been
undercut by the French “No” to the
European constitutional treaty, which has hampered progress toward
a more closely-knit EU foreign policy.
Mr. Bush’s reelection, which could have placed further strains
on U.S.-European relations, did not intensify
anti-American feelings in Europe.
Although, in another sweeping European trend, most Europeans preferred
Senator John Kerry, they did not generally blame the entire American
nation for the reelection of a President whose policies they disliked.
Instead, the level of negative and positive opinions of the United
States stabilized at the end of 2004 and at the beginning of 2005,
albeit at a very low level.
It was appreciated in Europe that many Americans voted to support the
President and the troops in Iraq for
patriotic reasons, without agreeing that the war was necessary. Opinion
polls taken shortly after the election suggested that nearly 60 percent
of Americans thought that the war was a mistake.
Elections offer another example of how Americans and Europeans react
differently: while many Americans support their President in difficult
circumstances, even when they disapprove
of some of his critical decisions, most
Europeans vote against their leaders in times of trouble, in the hope
of better policies to come.
As it turned out, President Bush’s trip to Brussels, Mainz, and
Bratislava succeeded in reversing negative trends in European public
opinion. In addition to the role undoubtedly played by President Bush’s
visit, a favorable reaction to the Iraqi elections also helped to turn
opinion around.
Nevertheless, more Europeans than Americans tend to think that elections
in Iraq, where society is riddled with
insecurity, corruption and other failings, do not justify the destruction
and the daily dangers resulting from the U.S.-led military intervention,
including having one Iraqi out of each thousand now dead. What is the
point of having an elected national assembly if the country is badly
damaged, society is undermined by racketeering and insecurity, and
terrorism has broken out where there was none before? The chance that
the European Union will evolve toward common policies favoring the
active promotion of regime change through military means is close to
zero. Where the United States believes in establishing democracies,
Europeans believe in reforming societies.
This distinction is linked to another contrast between Americans and
Europeans: differing degrees of tolerance
of collateral damage and unintended consequences a difference
that can also be seen in attitudes to work and unemployment. Most Americans
accept
that layoffs are necessary to facilitate economic adjustment, even
if millions of unemployed people suffer as a result. During the recession
of the early 1980s, I remember seeing an unemployed worker in Colorado
posing for a photo with the American flag on his back. He wanted to
make the point that he was sacrificing himself for the general good
of the nation. Unemployed people in Europe tend to hate the system
they feel has wronged them, and it is general practice to blame company
executives for layoffs, whatever economists might say about the expected
benefits.
By the same token, Europeans, who have had more than their share of
wars on their own continent, have now come to believe that anyone who
starts a
conflict has an obligation to foresee and assess the likely collateral
damage as
accurately as possible. Despite American good intentions, the European
perception remains that Washington failed
to conduct a proper evaluation of the
collateral damage to be expected in Iraq, and that efforts to prevent
it were inadequate. This notion of collateral damage, which hardly
features in the American media, is omnipresent in the European press.
“Europeans believe that Washington failed to evaluate likely
collateral damage in Iraq”
A survey of public opinion in France, Germany and the United States
published in February 2005 by the
German Marshall Fund of the United States showed that 88 percent of
those polled in France and 87 percent in
Germany disapproved “somewhat” or “very much” of
President Bush’s international policies. A majority (65 percent
in France and 57 percent in Germany) thought that it was “somewhat
undesirable” or “very undesirable” that the United
States should exert strong leadership in world affairs. Firm support
was expressed for the United Nations (70 percent in France and 76 percent
in
Germany, against 59 percent in the United States), in part because
a large group thinks that “many global problems can’t be
solved by any single country.”
It is interesting to note that NATO also received a good score, although
a majority of French and Germans thought that the European Union should “take
a more independent approach.” Sixty percent of the French and
65
percent of the Germans thought that “the United States should
work more through international organizations like the UN” and “the
United States should be more committed to diplomacy and not so fast
to use the military in international crises.”
“European opinion is being shaped by
the lack of international control over America’s extraordinary
military might”
More recently, a survey of public opinion released by the Pew Global
Attitudes Project on June 23, 2005 indicated that “anti-Americanism
in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, which surged as a result of the
U.S. war in Iraq, showed modest signs of abating. But the United States
remained broadly disliked in most countries surveyed, and the opinion
of the American people was not as positive as it once was.” In
addition, “there were no signs that Euro-skepticism about the
European Union following the French and Dutch refusals to ratify the
European constitutional treaty has fueled a desire for a closer Trans-Atlantic
partnership. On the contrary, most Europeans surveyed wanted to take
a more independent approach from the U.S. on security
and diplomatic affairs.” Roughly three-quarters of the publics in Germany
(77 percent), Canada (75 percent) and France (74 percent) say President
Bush’s reelection has made
them feel less
favorable toward the United States.
As in the past, the perception that the United States conducts a unilateral
foreign policy is shared across
the surveyed countries. Overwhelming
percentages of people in Europe and the Middle East believe that the
United States does not take their countries’
interests into account when making
foreign policy and wish that their
countries could act more independently. It is interesting, however,
to note that while China is well regarded in Europe and Asia, European
publics are opposed to the idea of China becoming a military rival
to the U.S. while in Turkey and other predominantly Muslim countries,
where antagonism toward the United States runs much deeper, most people
think a Chinese challenge to American military power would be a good
thing.
European opinion is obviously being shaped by the lack of international
control over America’s extraordinary military might, coupled
with the sight
of destruction and instances of cruel, perhaps illegal treatment of
prisoners. The visits to Europe of President Bush and Secretary of
State Condoleezza
Rice have sent new signals, to which
European public opinion has reacted
favorably. But the nomination of John Bolton as U.S. ambassador to
the UN and the appointment of Paul Wolfowitz as President of the World
Bank were
perceived as a countersignal. A good number of European commentators,
however, have suggested that such
conservative reformists might help change both the United Nations and
the World Bank for the better.
Asked if the partnership between the United States and the European
Union should become closer, remain about the same or whether the European
Union should take a more independent
approach from the United States in
security and diplomatic affairs, approximately half the Americans regularly
respond “become closer,” while only one fourth of the French
and Germans agree.
The terrorist attacks in London on July 7, 2005, however, have added
to
European motivations to work closely with the United States to fight
terrorism. Most Europeans still perceive the war in Iraq as a mistake
that generated more terrorists than security. The timely
report published in London on July 18 by Chatham House on Terrorism
and the UK concludes that: “A key problem with regard to implementing
prevention and pursuit is that the UK government has been conducting
counter-terrorism policy shoulder to shoulder with the U.S., not in
the sense of being an equal decision-maker, but rather as a pillion
passenger compelled to leave the steering to the ally in the driving
seat.
There is no doubt that the situation over Iraq has imposed particular
difficulties for the UK, and for the wider coalition against terrorism.
It gave a boost to the Al Qaeda network’s propaganda, recruitment
and fundraising, caused a major split in the coalition, provided an
ideal targeting and training area for Al Qaeda-linked terrorists, and
deflected resources and assistance that could have been deployed to
assist the Karzai government and to bring Bin Laden to justice. Riding
pillion with a powerful ally has proved costly in terms of British
and U.S. military lives, Iraqi lives, military expenditure, and the
damage caused to the counter-terrorism campaign.” When the British
government reacted publicly to criticize the conclusions of the study,
media comments all over Europe seemed to indicate that the officials
who expressed the government’s view were the very last group
who did not believe that the war on Iraq had been counterproductive
for the fight on terrorism.
“The French and
Dutch votes have consolidated British
and American
influence in Europe”
To achieve their common goals,
it will be important for the U.S. and
European governments to take longer-term public opinion trends into
account. In 2003, The European Institute conducted a special program
on the renewal of the Transatlantic relationship that
featured a study by Paul Luif, an
Austrian scholar, who had analyzed the voting patterns of EU members
in the UN General Assembly over a period of 20 years. Mr. Luif had
also examined the positions taken by the ten countries that joined
the European Union in May 2004, and compared overall European voting
patterns with that of the United States.
Although EU members do not agree on everything, they appear to vote
the same way on more and more issues.
The new EU member countries vote
differently, but their positions have for some time been drawing closer
to those of the European Union. Now that they are members, their positions
are likely
to converge even further. Analysis of
the positions of both old and new EU members shows that Europe tends
to
diverge from the United States.
Even as the French and the Dutch votes against the European constitutional
treaty have consolidated British and American influence in Europe and
strengthened the Anglo-Saxon vision of a loose confederation consisting
of a large free market with little political power, it is important
to remember that opinions still tend to diverge in Europe and the United
States on many world
issues. Denying differences will not be enough to manage tensions in
the
future. New mechanisms will be needed to help Europeans and Americans
understand each other, coordinate their actions and negotiate deals
and compromises. And the United States needs the Europeans to find
common solutions to challenges as much as the Europeans do themselves.
“The center of political gravity in Europe
is far to the left
of the U.S.”
This is even truer considering that values are evolving in different
directions in the two societies. While the United States becomes more
religious, Europe is fighting a battle to remain
secular, particularly against pressure from Islamic fundamentalists
in several countries. The Pew public opinion
survey indicates: “The biggest gap
between the way Americans are seen by other Western countries, and
the way they see themselves, is with respect to religion. Majorities
in France and the Netherlands and pluralities in Britain and Germany
see the United States as too religious.
By contrast, a 58 percent majority of Americans say their country is
not religious enough. On this point, Muslims find themselves in rare
agreement with the American public: majorities in
Indonesia, Pakistan, Lebanon and Turkey all believe the United States
is not
religious enough.”
There are other major, and sometimes growing, differences. In Europe,
acceptance of the death penalty is much lower than in the United States,
at least among the political classes, while the protection of workers
and social security issues are treated with a higher sense of collective
solidarity. Social concerns and aspirations for justice prevail on
one side, while business considerations and economic theories seem
to dominate on the other. It has been said that America is a “country
of opportunity, not of guarantee,” while Europe often seems to
be the reverse. The center of political gravity in Europe is far to
the left of that in the United States.
While unaware of the precise figures, most Europeans are deeply conscious
of the mutual benefits stemming from the U.S.-EU economic partnership,
which provides jobs for more than 12 million workers on each side of
the Atlantic. While seeking more leverage in the partnership, Europeans
know that the two regional economies are highly dependent. They also
know by experience that they always end up fighting side by
side with Americans when the cause is justified. This feeling of solidarity
has
increased in the European Union since the entry of eight Central and
Eastern European countries keen to express their gratitude to the United
States for facilitating their return to the free world after the Cold
War.
To strengthen their cooperation, and make it more effective, Europeans
and Americans should address the institutional framework of their dialogue.
While NATO remains the anchor of the Transatlantic Alliance, a
ménage à trois among the United States, the European Union and NATO will prove a delicate
endeavor, particularly if the European Union is temporarily losing
part of its expected ability to agree on common policies as a result
of the trials and tribulations of the EU constitution.
There is currently no grand project to review this situation, and most
experienced practitioners of Transatlantic
relations suggest that the best that can be achieved for the moment
is to try to manage the existing institutions better. A serious study
of the reasons why the Transatlantic dialogue went adrift in 2003 and
2004 might help. It would be worthwhile to review the procedures that
should have been followed, as well as those to be avoided in future.
In the medium term, a constructive role for think tanks would be to
craft a
more ambitious vision of the kind of common institutions needed to
improve Transatlantic collaboration.
Meanwhile, the United States could significantly improve its image
in Europe by undertaking specific initiatives such as the following:
Make more effort to explain U.S. policies to Europeans, rather
than only to American voters. It would be important, for instance,
for Europeans to hear confirmation that prisoners of the U.S. military
or other agencies are protected by U.S. laws and the Geneva Conventions,
or to know that American leaders take climate change seriously even
if they do not agree with Europe on how to deal with it.
- Explain the doctrine of preemptive intervention within the context
of possible UN reform.
- Clarify allied expectations in NATO by seeking agreement on
what Washington means by “the mission
defines the coalition,” rather than the
reverse. Are allies, for example just
instruments in the NATO “toolbox” to be used or not at
will by the United States?
- Clarify the attitude of the United States toward international
treaties that it negotiates and encourages its allies to endorse, but
that the U.S. Senate does not ratify.
- Stop periodically trying to divide Germany and France, as they
are the two pillars of European continental stability, and the United
States might not like the consequences if it actually succeeded in
driving a wedge between them.
- Remain actively involved in Trans-atlantic networks that share
a sense of collective destiny.
- Improve real cooperation in the governance system of the alliance.
“Demography will inevitably increase Muslim influence
over Europe”
As demography will inevitably
increase Muslim influence over Europe in the coming decades, a loss
of mutual confidence and close relations would be the worst strategic
failure of both the United States and European governments. In addition,
there is a growing
international desire to search for
new economic and political models that could be more attractive than
the American system to millions of the world’s
inhabitants. The dangers presented by this trend, at a time when new
powers are emerging in Asia and elsewhere, should not be underestimated.
European public opinion and intellectual elites will influence the
way this debate evolves. In the process, the United States may have
to recognize that Europeans should be treated as allies, not as “tools
in a box,” while Europeans should remember that many of the benefits
they now enjoy in their daily lives are in large part attributable
to the determination and entrepreneurship of the United States in the
last half century.
Jacqueline Grapin is President of The European Institute and Publisher
of European Affairs.
This article is a revised version of a working paper produced for the
CSIS Think Tank Summit on The Future of U.S.-EU-NATO Relations after
the Cold War and Beyond the War in Iraq at Wye Plantation, Maryland,
in April 2005.
go to top 
