Since the 1980s, there have been only four significant terrorist acts
involving the use of biological or chemical weapons. The best known
were carried out by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group, which killed
19 people in two Japanese cities (Matsumoto in 1994 and Tokyo in 1995)
by spreading the nerve gas Sarin in subway trains. Aum also worked
on various biological agents and tried to disperse anthrax in Tokyo.
It is also known that Al Qaeda members tried to acquire biological
agents in the former Soviet Union,
and there is ample evidence that Al Qaeda tried to develop and produce
chemical and biological weapons in Afghanistan.
U.S. forces advancing into Afghan cities found computer files left
behind by Al Qaeda members and a laboratory under construction during
the Enduring Freedom campaign in 2001/2002. In October 2001, five U.S.
citizens died from exposure to
anthrax contained in letters sent through the mail, although the perpetrator
remains unknown and a terrorist background has not yet been proven.
Given that the attacks so far represent only a minimal fraction of
the overall number of terrorist acts in the last 20 years, why are
we so concerned? There are a number of reasons why we should be.
The likelihood that modern terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction
is increased by their desire to inflict high numbers of casualties.
Unlike most of the more “traditional” social-revolutionary
and ethno-national terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s, groups
like Al Qaeda do not differentiate between
victims among the general population and selected targets such as political
or military leaders. The victims themselves have no particular importance
for the terrorists, except as part of a communication strategy. In
fact, an attack against a large number of civilians may have an even
bigger impact in terms of terrorizing the population and disrupting
political and economic stability than attacks on so-called “hard
targets,” such as political leadership structures or the military.
In other words, from the terrorists’ point of view, an attack
is most “successful” when it kills the greatest number
of
people.
So far, most major terrorist attacks have been committed with conventional
means, particularly bombs and improvised explosive devices. September
11 represented a new qualitative development because civilian airliners
were turned into deadly, high-energy weapons. There is, however, no
doubt that using chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) weapons
in an attack would help to further terrorist objectives, either by
causing mass casualties and/or by instilling even greater terror because
of the particular nature of
these weapons. Even if such an attack produced lower casualties than
a
conventional explosion, the perception of the particularly inhuman
character of such devices, the fear of their contents and their possible
long-term consequences (such as contamination or the spread of mass
diseases) gives such
attacks a new, frightening dimension and would probably cause widespread
panic.
It is precisely this new dimension that is desirable from a terrorist’s
point of view, since terrorists need to sustain a high, possibly escalating
level of violence to achieve their targets. Targeted states and societies
tend to be able to cope with certain levels of violence. In addition,
in most countries, comprehensive security measures have been introduced
to
prevent conventional terrorist attacks. “More of the same” often
increases the resilience of a society facing such attacks instead of
breaking its resolve. The coercive effects of terrorist acts increase
considerably, however, with a sustained high rate of incidence, high
casualties and particularly escalation, including the use of new kinds
of attacks.
Factors that generally limit the
usefulness of CBR weapons for armed forces, such as the risk to their
own forces, the contamination of territory to be occupied or defended
and the threat of retaliation, do not apply to terrorists, at least
not to suicide terrorists. Unlike armed forces, terrorists do not aim
at
occupying another party’s territory in order to defend their
own. They do not operate in large units and their own
survival is often not essential. Also, time is not of the essence,
since Al Qaeda and related groups have a very long-term agenda and unlike
military forces do not need to concentrate troops at a given
time to score a victory or prevent enemy invasion. Technically and
financially, the obstacles to producing or acquiring CBR weapons may
be considerable, but not insurmountable. The same is true for transporting
and dispersing them. Other factors that suggest a clear increase in
the threat include:
“Information about biological weapons is often easily accessable
through the Internet”
- Information about biological weapons and the science and technology
associated with them is widely scattered in libraries and other document
depositories all over the world. It is often easily accessible through
the Internet
- The rapid advance of new
technologies in genetic manipulation and biotechnology greatly simplifies
development processes and techniques, which once required complex equipment
and considerable technical skill.
- Terrorists have become more
sophisticated and are often highly
educated, frequently with university
degrees in science.
Biological agents might be used by various groups. The most dangerous
seem to be large organizations that are well funded, such as Aum Shinrikyo,
and possibly even state-supported. Since Al Qaeda has lost its territorial
base and state sponsoring is declining, the probability of a very high-impact
attack is low. Small groups or individuals, however, may well be able
to attack limited targets like buildings or aircraft, and might use
biological pathogens in murder plots or simply to cause confusion and
panic. The anthrax attacks in the United States and subsequent worldwide
hoaxes are examples of this.
“Counter-measures
are being taken
in Germany,
the EU and NATO”
Experts consider the so-called “dirty dozen” toxins and
diseases to be the most suitable biological agents for
terrorist attacks, since they have properties that allow for release
or dispersion. These are bacteria (Anthrax, Plague,
Tularemia, Glanders and Meliodoses, Brucelloses and Q fever), viruses
(Smallpox, Viral Encephalitis, and Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers) and toxins
(Botulinum, Ricin and Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B). Among them, anthrax
and smallpox seem to have the greatest potential for mass casualties
and civil disruption, not least because of their high lethality.
Some biological agents like anthrax are particularly attractive to
terrorists because they are stable in aerosol form and fairly easily
dispersed, for example through heating, ventilation and air conditioning
ducts, as well as being suitable for large-scale production. It would
be very difficult to procure smallpox
virus. If, however, it were obtained and released, smallpox could cause
a public health catastrophe because of its high communicability.
Meanwhile, measures are being taken in Germany, in the European Union
and in NATO to deal with the
rising threat. In Germany, the first
responsibility for public order, as well as for public health, lies
with the 16 federal states (Länder), and the central government
has a mostly subsidiary responsibility. The central government, however,
has primary responsibility for civil
protection in cases of national emergency, such as intentional manmade
disasters, attacks by foreign powers or major terrorist operations
involving CBR weapons. The central government and the states have accordingly
developed a new multi-stage strategy for
protecting the civilian population. Risk categories have been established,
depending on potential threats and
population densities, and special task forces are being set up to deal
with
biological or chemical attacks. Information systems are being better
coordinated and, under certain conditions, states may call on the federal
army for assistance.
In order to guarantee immediate, countrywide access to expertise in
bioterrorism, a Center for Biological
Security has been established in Berlin, together with an Outbreak
Investigation Team that can be dispatched to any state at very short
notice. A new Federal Agency for the Protection of the Population,
established in May 2004, is responsible for preparing crisis management
plans and measures to protect critical
infrastructures. The agency’s duties also include helping to
inform the public,
encouraging research and development and providing education and training.
Other initiatives include the establishment of a joint working group
to
prevent the outbreak of smallpox, which is also drawing up national
influenza protection plans.
The Federal Government is preparing the establishment of biological
task forces in cooperation with a number
of scientific research institutions and
is helping the states to improve their
capacities, for example by supplying them with more than 370 vehicles
for detecting CBR and nuclear weapons. Germany also now has a national,
decentralized depository of smallpox vaccine, more than enough to vaccinate
everybody living in Germany. Stocks of
appropriate antibiotics have been
replenished and a new satellite-based alert system has been created
to warn the population via radio about potential dangers, including
terrorist attacks.
But Germany is not limiting itself to national measures. The European
Union has established an information and rapid alert system for biological
and chemical attacks and threats that is connected to national networks.
This allows all EU member states to inform each other in real time
about biological and chemical attacks and to exchange information about
how to counter them. The EU countries have also adopted a solidarity
program aimed at improving cooperation in preventing biological and
chemical attacks and mitigating their consequences. The program covers
areas such as civil protection, health, food, the environment, sensitive
industries and transportation.
NATO has also adopted a number of measures to strengthen protection
against terrorists using CBR or nuclear weapons. Major elements are
an international data base of existing resources in NATO member states,
such as protective gear, detection equipment, vaccines and antibiotics,
as well as an action plan
for improving prevention and the
management of the consequences of
an attack.
Georg Witschel is Federal Government Commissioner for Combating International
Terrorism at the German Foreign Office in Berlin. He was previously
Director of the UN Policy Division of the German Foreign Office. Before
that, he was Deputy Director of the Political Department and Legal
Adviser in the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations in
New York. He also has served as Deputy Ambassador and Head of the Economic
Department at the German Embassy in Ljubljana and as Political Counselor
in Tel Aviv.
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