After half a century of reluctance to commit fully to European
integration, Britain is on the verge of another potential crisis
with its EU partners. The new crisis is unlikely to be provoked by
the general election that Prime Minister Tony Blair has called for
May 5, at least not if Mr. Blair wins the election as expected. The
crunch will come when Mr. Blair calls on Britons to approve the
new European constitution in a separate referendum in 2006, a
vote he could well lose.
If Britain were to say “No,” and especially if it were the only
EU member state to do so, the country’s entire future relations
with the rest of Europe, including British EU membership, would
be called into question. The crisis could also come much sooner
in the less likely event that the opposition Conservatives won
the May 5 election. The Conservatives are committed to rejecting
the constitution and have said they will hold a referendum within
six months of gaining power. But whether Britain says “Yes”
or “No,” its long-running European dilemma is unlikely to be
resolved in the foreseeable future.
One afternoon in early January, 2002, as euro bills and coins
were starting to circulate in the 12 countries that had joined the
EU single currency, an elderly lady entered a small shop in southern
England and tendered a £20 note for her purchase. “And don’t
give me any of them euros in the change,” she told the shopkeeper.
“Don’t worry,” he replied, “that’s only for the French and Germans.”
A relieved look came over the lady’s face. “Well, that’s all
right then,” she said.
The lady was only a sample of one. But she exemplified two
longstanding features of the national mentality, rooted deep in
history, culture and geography, which still have profound political consequences in
today’s Britain. The first is widespread ignorance about European integration, including,
most seriously, a failure to understand that EU membership is not a static condition
but a dynamic process; the second a deeply ingrained belief that while plenty of
newfangled ideas dreamed up in Brussels may be fine for continental Europe, they are
not all right for Britain.
The well-grounded national instinct
that tells Britons they are different from
other Europeans has bedeviled the country’s
relations with its European neighbors
ever since postwar European
integration began in the 1950s. In the
half century since World War II, during
which their country was obliged to dismantle
one of the world’s greatest empires,
the British have failed to find a
comfortable home in the European
Union, or to define clearly the role they
want to play in Europe.
Since joining the Union 15 years
after the original six founding members,
in 1973, Britain in fact has fought a constant
rearguard action, interspersed with
occasional tantrums and frequent demands
for special treatment, against the
drive by continental countries for closer
political unity in Europe. Although the
British bulldog usually ends up joining
the pack of continental hounds as they
move forward, it often has to be dragged
along on a leash. Sometimes it manages
to stay in its kennel. Britain is the only
country among the 15 member states of
the European Union before its enlargement
in May 2004 to have stayed out of
both the euro and the Schengen agreement
abolishing EU internal borders for
travelers.
Now the British are facing another
looming crisis in this seemingly endless
saga of Hamlet-like aversion to commitment.
The crisis is unlikely to be precipitated
by the general election that Prime
Minister Tony Blair has called for May 5
– or at least not if he wins it, as expected,
albeit with a smaller majority. Provided
Mr. Blair carries the election – or even if
he is forced to form a coalition with the
much smaller, pro-European Liberal Democrats
– the crunch will come in the
referendum on the European constitution
that Mr. Blair has promised for
2006. By making this pledge, against his
better judgment,Mr. Blair, who supports
the constitution, has taken a huge gamble
with his own and the country’s future.
It is perfectly possible, though by
no means certain, that a majority of the
British electorate will say “No” to the
constitution, reopening the whole issue
of Britain’s future links with its neighbors,
including perhaps its membership
of the European Union.
The moment of truth would come far sooner in the less likely
event that the Conservative opposition were to win the May 5
election. The Conservatives have not only announced their opposition
to the constitution, but also promised to hold a referendum
within six months of coming to power. That would mean before
the end of November, in the event of a Conservative election
victory. And if the Conservatives were to achieve a surprise
election upset, it would suggest that the British public might
be more inclined to follow their lead and throw out the constitution.
The crisis would be even more intense
if, as is also perfectly possible,
Britain were the only one of the current
25 EU member states to reject the constitution.
A recent Eurobarometer poll,
published by the European Commission
in January, found that Britain was the
only EU country in which more people
opposed than supported the constitution.
It is not without reason that some
French history teachers used to begin
each lesson with the admonition: “Never
forget that England is an island.” As Darwin
showed in the Galapagos, island
creatures tend to evolve differently from
their mainland counterparts.
“The crisis would be even
more intense if Britain
were the only country to
reject the constitution”
Of course, Britain has changed immeasurably
in the past half century.
Today it faces more toward the continent,
and less to the open sea, than at
any time since the start of the Elizabethan
era in the 16th century. Around
60 percent of British exports go to the
rest of Europe, and London has become
a magnet for young Europeans seeking
exciting jobs in finance and high technology
in an easy-going, freewheeling
society. Not least because of the Channel
Tunnel, more Britons visit the continent
than ever before, and many more speak
French, German and other European
languages.
But multicultural London is as
much a global as a European center. Its
ever closer cultural and business ties
with New York, for instance, have led
one leading American news magazine to
lump the two together as virtually a single
city and dub it “NyLon.” At the same
time, as London has become more Europeanized
and globalized, the capital has
become less representative of the rest of
Britain, especially the countryside.
Rural England has not suffered the
supposed national “identity crisis” announced
with such great fanfare by the
London-centric media in recent years,
and is still home to the country’s traditional,
if perhaps sometimes insular, values.
In 1999, former Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher struck a chord with
many voters, and not just conservatives,
when she stated that, “In my lifetime all
our problems have come from mainland
Europe and the solutions have come
from the English-speaking nations of the
world.”
“For the British,
participation in
European integration
seemed like the forced
acceptance of an
unwanted destiny”
Although many Britons know that
logically their country’s place is now in
Europe, many also understandably find
that unwelcome truth hard to reconcile
with centuries of history in which
Britain’s aim was to create a balance of
power on the continent so that it could
venture out onto the high seas, where it
really belonged, and pursue the expansion
of the English-speaking peoples. As
for the proposed EU constitutional
treaty, Britain has never even had a written
constitution, let alone one mostly
drafted by foreigners.
After World War II, the continental
countries saw the construction of a
united Europe as akin to a Phoenix rising
from the ashes, a triumphant renaissance
of hope in the wake of agony and
devastation. Except for a few neutral
states, all the West European continental
countries were occupied or defeated, or
both, in the war. Britain alone suffered
neither fate – on the contrary, the country
fought ferociously and victoriously to
preserve its nearly 1,000 years of independence.
For the British, participation
in European integration, with its plans
for the pooling of national sovereignty,
seemed more like a defeat, the forced acceptance
of an unwanted destiny
It is true, of course, that many of the
country’s leaders, including Mr. Blair,
believe that Britain’s interests are best
served by playing a leading role in the
European Union, and there are plenty of
pro-Europeans, even supporters of a federal
Europe, among the country’s elite.
There are valid arguments that Britain,
as a medium-sized European power
comparable to France, can best project
its influence as part of a strong, united
Europe. U.S. governments have also traditionally
supported an active British
role in European unification to help
steer the continent toward open markets
and Atlanticism.
Nevertheless, Britain has now been a
member of the European Union for a
generation and a half, and many Britons
still harbor a lingering mistrust of their
continental neighbors, particularly of
France and Germany, and a resentment
of centralized decision-making in Brussels.
In the nation at large, there is a
widespread feeling that successive British
governments have not come totally clean
about their intentions with regard to
Europe – that the country has unwittingly
been drawn much farther into a
supranational venture than it knew or
wanted.When Britons hear about some
new advance toward closer unity, such as
the euro or the constitution, they often
complain that “this is not the Europe we
joined,” or “we were never told about
this.”
Such objections are partly due to the
widespread British inability to understand
that joining the European Union
was the equivalent of boarding a moving
train, not one permanently stopped in
the same station. But it is also true that
governments have often sold European
integration to the voters by persuading
them it will mean fewer changes for
Britain than it really does. Mr. Blair, for
example, is not telling the whole truth
when he insists that a British decision to
join the euro would not be political, but
purely economic – and large numbers of
his fellow citizens know it.
In a poll conducted by YouGov Ltd.
in January 2005, an astonishing 67 percent
of respondents agreed with the
statement that “successive governments
have frequently misled the public about
how Britain’s relationship with the European
Union was in fact developing.” An
even more overwhelming 79 percent said
they felt that the British people had not
been sufficiently consulted about how
they wanted the relationship to develop.
This is why, virtually every time he
joins in a significant political decision in
Brussels, Mr. Blair immediately goes on
television to reassure his compatriots
that they are not being sucked into a
“European Superstate.” It is why the government’s
campaign for a “Yes” vote in
the constitutional referendum will focus
mainly on persuading the public that the
constitution does not change very much
in practice, that it is simply a tidying up
of previous European treaties and certainly
not a step toward a federal Europe
– even though many on the continent
have welcomed it as precisely that.
In an attempt to destroy “myths”
about the constitutional treaty, the Foreign
Office is circulating a series of brief
rebuttals containing apparently little
known “facts” such as these: the common
foreign policy is not new, Britain
will not be forced to join the euro, the
Queen will remain Head of State, British
armed forces will remain under British
control and the new European Charter
of Fundamental Rights will not prevent
women-only swimming or outlaw Sunday
School.
“The government’s
campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote
will focus on persuading
voters that the
constitution does not
change very much”
All that may well be true, and it is
certainly to the nation’s advantage to
have the facts in front of it before people
vote. It does not alter the reality, however,
that one of the main reasons why
Mr. Blair’s decision to hold a referendum
is so risky is the British people’s basic
mistrust of government statements
about Europe – a factor of which Mr.
Blair is fully aware. It was a decision he
did not want to take. He ultimately did
so, in April 2004, under heavy political
and media pressure. Even though referendums
are not part of Britain’s constitutional
traditions (Britain does have
Yet Again, an EU Crisis Looms for Britain
an unwritten constitution) it became
increasingly difficult to resist demands
that the people have their say.
Like so many of Mr. Blair’s important
decisions, with the notable exception
of his commitment to support the
United States over Iraq, his choice of
timing for the referendum was
prompted less by a long-term, strategic
view of Britain’s role in Europe or the
world, but by tactical, short-term political
considerations. In order to avoid another
damaging wrangle over Europe in
this year’s national election campaign, he
hoped to defer a divisive debate on the
constitution until later – in much the
same way as President Jacques Chirac
has tried to postpone the controversy in
France over Turkish EU entry by promising
a referendum if and when Turkey
comes close to joining, perhaps in ten
years’ time.
“Although Mr. Blair has
long promised a
referendum on the euro,
he has consistently
evaded the issue”
The ruse looks likely to be only partially
successful in the short term - and
positively dangerous for Mr. Blair in the
medium term. The Conservative Party is
not holding back on Europe before the
election, and the campaign against the
constitution by the Vote No movement is
already in full swing. Mr. Blair’s government,
while mildly defending the constitution,
is constrained by its desire not to
make Europe an election issue.
Mr. Blair, however, is unlikely to lose
the election on Europe. In the YouGov
survey cited above, only 20 percent of respondents
said that Europe, including
the euro and the constitution, was the
most important issue facing the country.
Europe ranked ninth, far behind concerns
over law and order, health, immigration,
pensions, poverty and social
security. When asked what mattered
most “to you and your family,” only 12
percent opted for Europe, dropping its
ranking to twelfth.
Europe, indeed, has hardly figured as
a major topic in the election, which is
being fought almost entirely on domestic
issues. Mr. Blair’s New Labour Party
has chosen its success in managing the
economy and education as the main
themes for its campaign. The Conservatives
are focusing on improving the police
force, hospitals and schools,
lowering taxes and controlling immigration.
In Reaganesque terms, they
say they want to get government off
people’s backs.
There are good reasons for politicians
to be wary of the European issue.
Political infighting over Europe contributed
to the fall of both of Mr. Blair’s
Conservative predecessors, Margaret
Thatcher and John Major, and the
British public is deeply suspicious of the
constitution. Mr. Blair has a history of
shunning risky positions on Europe. Although
he has long promised a referendum
on joining the euro, and pledged to
campaign strongly for it, he has consistently
evaded the issue by pushing it into
the future. He has snared himself in a
Catch 22. He will not hold a referendum
on the euro until he is sure of winning,
but he cannot win unless he comes out
and campaigns vigorously for it, and he
does not want to do that in case he loses.
On the euro,Mr. Blair has the excuse
that his colleague and arch political rival,
Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, has declared that the economic
conditions are not right for
Britain to join the single currency. But
while Mr. Blair still hopes to get away
with his argument that the decision on
the euro is basically economic, he cannot
deny that the issues posed by the constitution
are political, or postpone the constitutional
referendum beyond next year.
The constitution must be ratified in all
25 member states by the autumn of 2006
if it is to enter into force.
The danger for Mr. Blair is that by
deciding to hold a referendum on the
constitution after the election, he has
separated out the European issue, on
which he is widely opposed, from all the
other issues, on which he is more popular.
It is clear that hostility to the constitution
is pervasive, although there are
some signs that it is diminishing. In February,
a poll commissioned by The Times
newspaper reported that 36 percent favored
approval of the constitution, compared
with only 29 percent against. The
poll followed another survey at the end
of January that showed 39 percent in
favor and 41 percent against.
The constitution’s proponents believe
that people will rally to the cause
once the debate gets fully under way and
they learn more about it. “Victory for the
‘Yes’ campaign is achievable,” says Simon
Hughes, President of the opposition Liberal
Democrats, who support the constitution.
Lucy Powell, Director of Britain
in Europe, which is campaigning for a
“Yes” vote, confidently predicts that “as
people understand what the treaty will
and won’t do, they will reject the isolation
proposed by the No campaign and
vote to approve the new treaty.”
Other polls, however, have detected
massive resistance. A survey cited at the
end of January by The Sun, the country’s
biggest selling newspaper, suggested that
56 percent would vote “No,” and only 24
percent “Yes.” The Vote No movement
has stated that 60 percent of
Britain’s biggest companies oppose the
constitution.
In March, Roger Liddle, who advised
Mr. Blair on Europe for seven years from
1997 to 2004, warned that the government
must start campaigning on “day
one” after the election if it is to avoid the
“unmitigated political disaster” of losing
the referendum. He urged the government
to give priority to its links with Europe
rather than talking about Britain’s
special relationship with the United
States.
“The constitution’s
supporters believe
that a victory
for the ‘Yes’ campaign
is achievable”
In fact, with the election approaching,
Mr. Blair has been doing precisely
that for the past few months. Anxious to
disprove the common allegation that he
has played the role of President George
W. Bush’s “poodle” over Iraq, Mr. Blair
has been seeking to insinuate himself
into the Franco-German partnership to
make the point that he is a European as
well as an Atlantic leader. While it is
doubtful that he will ever gain full entry
into the Franco-German club – Mr.
Chirac has told him that to his face – he
has been making some progress. In their
joint diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran
to abandon nuclear weapons, Britain,
France and Germany are now habitually
described as the EU-3, a designation that
annoys many other EU countries and
most of all Italy, which considers itself a
fully paid-up member of the European
Union’s “Big Four.”
Mr. Blair will also try to make the
most of Britain’s presidency of the European
Union in the second half of 2005 to
show that the country has an important
and influential role to play in Europe. He
will also seek to showcase Britain’s international
clout as a major European
power during the country’s chairmanship
of the G8 throughout this year.
“It is ironic that many
European integrationists
dislike the constitution
because it is too
‘Anglo-Saxon’ ”
It is far from certain, however, that
consorting so openly with European
leaders will help Mr. Blair very much in
the referendum campaign. The government
argues that approving the constitution
will help to maximize Britain’s
influence in Europe and the world,
whereas rejecting it would “isolate ourselves
in an organization so vital to our
national interests,” in the words of Jack
Straw, the Foreign Secretary. If the “No”
vote prevails, he says, Britain will enter
“unknown territory” and be left “weak
and isolated” in Europe. Rejection of the
constitution would imperil Britain’s
“power and prosperity,” leaving the
country “out on the margins with no say
in Europe’s future direction.”
Opponents of the constitution, on
the other hand, are not impressed by Mr.
Blair’s forming common positions with
France and Germany, precisely because
they want Britain to maintain its independence
in domestic and foreign affairs.
On the economic front, Michael
Howard, the Conservative leader, also argues
that the constitution will “make Europe’s
economy even less flexible, even
less competitive and even more sluggish
than it is today.” It is ironic that while
many European integrationists in other
countries dislike the constitution because
it is too “Anglo-Saxon,” the main
argument of the treaty’s opponents in
Britain is that it constitutes a threat to
British national sovereignty.
It is true that Mr. Blair managed to
dilute many of the more integrationist
aspects of the constitution during negotiations
with his EU partners in 2004. He
successfully defended his “red lines” –
demands that the national veto be preserved
in foreign and defense policy as
well as in fiscal matters and social security.
Some supporters of free markets
argue that the maintenance of the veto
in tax policy was the biggest single success
story of the negotiations, in that it
will prevent a majority led by France and
Germany from imposing their suffocating
high tax rates throughout the Union.
Many of the constitution’s critics in
France, on the other hand, argue that is
precisely for such reasons that the constitution
is in fact an “ultra-liberal”
charter that will destroy traditional continental
social solidarity.
In defending the constitution in
Britain, Mr. Straw has actually sought to
confirm many of the integrationists’
worst fears. The constitution, he said in
February, “gives us our kind of Europe,
based firmly on the power and legitimacy
of the nations of Europe.” Translated
into the language of Brussels, he
means that those in favor of inter-governmental
decision-making have triumphed
over those, especially in Germany,
who want a more federal or
supranational Europe.
Of course, each government will defend
the constitution in the way that
most appeals to its own electorate. And
differing interpretations are encouraged
by the numerous contradictions and ambiguities
contained in the lengthy and
often complex text. But the need to appeal
to British voters puts the government
in an especially awkward position.
The essentially negative argument that
the constitution does not really change
very much is hardly an inspiring battle
cry. Mr. Blair and his colleagues cannot
promote the treaty as a positive step toward
the noble vision of a united Europe,
because that is precisely what most
Britons do not want.
One of the main characteristics that
distinguish the British from their continental
neighbors is a deep suspicion of
visionary concepts, indeed of any kind of
concepts at all. To the extent that they
view European integration in a positive
light, most Britons have always seen it as
a predominantly economic exercise that
they hope will bring practical benefits in
terms of trade and investment. With
their pragmatic approach to problemsolving,
their preference for action over
philosophizing and their common law
history, Britons are deeply suspicious of
grand designs and ideals, which they
think may point the way to tyranny and
totalitarianism. A statement once made
by Mr. Chirac, that “Europe is not a continent;
it is an idea,” is virtually incomprehensible
to most British people (as
well as to most Americans).
It is this reluctance to embrace the
“European ideal” that has rendered
British intentions so suspicious to some
of its partners, and particularly to
France, throughout the constant toingand-
froing over Britain’s relations with
Europe during the past half century.
Some of this is due to a cultural misunderstanding.
Often, by questioning what
they see as woolly-minded conceptual
thinking, the practical British are not so
much conspiring to undermine the drive
to a united Europe as seeking to understand
what it means before they embrace
it. On the other hand, of course, it is true
that they do not want it to go as
far as the most ardent integrationists
would like.
Whether or not they are misunderstood,
however, the least one can say is
that British attitudes have not endeared
the nation to many of its continental
partners, who believe that you must
commit yourself to the concept first and
then work out the details. (The British
believe that you work out the details first
and then consider how best to describe
the end result.)
“One of the main
characteristics that
distinguishes the British
is a deep suspicion of
visionary concepts”
What all this means in today’s political
context is that rejection of the constitution
by Britain, and particularly by
Britain alone, would not be received
with much sympathy in Paris and Berlin.
Quite apart from the constitution, many
in France and Germany believe that
Britain’s alliance with the United States
over Iraq once again demonstrated the
truth of De Gaulle’s historic warning
that Britain could never be really European
so long as it maintained its ties to
the English-speaking world. While a
number of Britain’s friends might not
want to see the country isolated, they
would be less inclined to offer the British
another chance if they had themselves
ratified the constitution.
“Britain might be forced
out of the European
Union, by its partners or
its own public opinion”
The consequences of such an outcome
can for now only be a subject for
speculation. As Dana Spinant argues
elsewhere in this issue of European Affairs,
Britain might find itself forced out
of the European Union, by pressure either
from its continental partners or
from its own public opinion. Rightly or
wrongly, many Britons would not consider
this a complete disaster.
In the YouGov poll, only 27 percent
said they wanted either more or full European
integration. Sixteen percent
wanted to maintain Britain’s relationship
with the rest of Europe roughly as it is.
Forty-seven percent, however, wanted a
much less integrated Europe, with the
European Union reduced to little more
than a free trade area, or complete
British withdrawal from the Union.
If Britain left the Union, of course, it
would not sever all links with it. There
would have to be difficult negotiations to
maintain the economic links between
the 24-nation Union and Britain to
avoid a complete disruption of trade.
Britain would probably seek some kind
of associate status, perhaps based on the
European Economic Area, of which only
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are
currently members.What is clear, however,
is that Britain would lose all influence
over economic and financial
decisions that affected its interests and
over the future political direction of Europe.
It is by drumming home this risk
that the supporters of the constitution,
and of active British EU membership,
hope to win a possibly narrow victory in
the referendum. The Conservative idea
that Britain could say “No” to the constitution,
stay in the European Union and
negotiate a new treaty returning more
powers to national governments does
not seem realistic in the current European
political context. Even if the constitution’s
advocates fail to convince the
voters, they have at least one hope left:
that some of their fellow Europeans will
save them. Britain would be released
from the threat of political crisis if a
number of other EU member states,
preferably including France, were also to
say “No.” That is the main reason why
Mr. Blair is planning to hold the vote in
Britain last of all the 25 member states.
Mr. Blair wants to go down in history
as a European as well as a British
and Atlantic statesman. But that is not
the only reason he will campaign for a
“Yes” vote. He would almost certainly
have to resign if the constitution were rejected.
By going last, his idea is that massive
pressures will mount on the British
to say “Yes” if everyone else has already
approved the constitution. Alternatively,
Mr. Blair will be off the hook if other
countries have already said “No,” thus
ensuring that the constitution, which
must be ratified unanimously, cannot
enter into force.
That, of course, would not be the
end of the story. Rejection of the
constitution would not end debate on the future
of Europe. Too many continental
countries want to continue toward the
ever-closer union prescribed in the
Rome Treaty, which laid the foundations
of the European Union in 1957, for the
effort to be abandoned. Although the
risk of an immediate clash with its
neighbors would be averted, London
would still face the as yet insoluble
problem of devising an acceptable relationship
with a group of powerful neighbors
that want more integration than
Britain does.
The same would equally apply if
British voters accepted the constitution,
especially if they did so on the basis of
promises by the government that nothing
would really change. If the constitution
enters into force, there is little doubt
that it will have far greater integrationist
consequences than the British are currently
being led to expect. The same old
complaints that the government has
misled the people will once again, quite
rightly, be heard.
The best outcome would be for the
British to use the referendum finally to
decide in a clear cut manner, and in full
knowledge of the facts, whether they
want to join in further European political
integration or to stay out of it. If they
choose to participate, they should try to
show some enthusiasm for the constitution
and the further moves toward integration
that it implies. If not, they
should end the debilitating, half-hearted
relationship with the rest of Europe in
which they have for so long indulged,
and negotiate a separate, durable, special
status.
The problem will never be solved
until the British people actually make up
their minds as to what they really want.
They are now being given an opportunity
to do so. Unfortunately, the referendum
is unlikely to produce such a clear
cut result, nor are the subsequent maneuverings
inside the European Union if
the British, and perhaps some others, say
“No.” In other words, the curtain is unlikely
to come down on the long-running
tragicomedy of Britain’s indecision
over whether it wants to be or not to be
in Europe for the foreseeable future.
Reginald Dale is Editor-in-Chief of European Affairs, a regular contributor to the International
Herald Tribune and a media fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He was previously
a senior editor and foreign correspondent for the International Herald Tribune and the
London Financial Times.
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