In the past two years, U.S.-German
relations, and more broadly the Transatlantic
partnership, have suffered probably
the worst upheavals in five decades of
close cooperation. Everybody has read
the headlines proclaiming deep divisions
in the run-up to the war in Iraq and its
aftermath. Stephen Szabo’s amply documented
and well-written contribution is
the story behind the headlines: the clash
of political titans, the bad diplomacy,
bad politics and bad timing that undermined
half a century of well-defined national
roles and more or less steady
partnership.
It is still unclear how far the United
States and Europe will be able to repair
their damaged relations, and particularly
the bitter rifts between the United States
and Paris and Berlin. As Szabo points
out, this is more than a game on the
diplomatic chessboard, more than an exercise
in patching-up and papering over
differences with handshakes and polite
words. Although Iraq was the flashpoint
that brought matters to a boil, there was
already a deep mistrust in Europe over
the motivation and strategic goals of the
United States.
These tensions came to a head at a
time when Europe was in a “plastic” expansion
phase, increasing its territory
and struggling over internal governance,
while seeking to exert the “soft power”of
diplomacy and economic influence in
counterbalance to the hard military
power of the United States. Long-shared
visions of Atlantic and European unity
are still being severely strained by the
different strategic goals of America and
continental Europe.
In Szabo’s book we see the recent
clashes through the lens of deteriorating
U.S.-German relations, which were given
a push in the wrong direction at the outset
by bad personal chemistry between
President George W. Bush and Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder. Both took office
with little knowledge of or emphasis on
foreign policy, preferring to stake their
leadership on domestic concerns. The
lack of foreign experience explains some
of the serious missteps by both sides.
During Schroeder’s first visit to
Washington, intended to provide a triumphal
display of U.S.-German amity,
the Bush Administration clumsily pulled
the rug from under him, deeply embarrassing
the Chancellor and his Green
Party coalition partners. Thirty minutes
before an Oval Office meeting between
the two leaders, Condoleezza Rice, the
then new U.S. National Security Advisor,
announced that the Kyoto Protocol on
climate control was dead. This was followed
by a series of blunt statements by
the U.S. team castigating multilateral initiatives
in which Germany was a key
partner. Bush and his “neo-conservative”
advisors, who appeared to be advocating
unilateralism and preemptive
strikes, were almost disdainful of
Schroeder’s more cautious policies.
Both ideologically and personally,
the two leaders were poles apart. Bush,
born to privilege, prone to passionate
convictions and little self-doubt, attached
huge importance to personal loyalty.
Schroeder, on the other hand, had
clawed his way to the top from humble
beginnings after his father was killed in
World War II. Unlike most of the German
political elite, he did not go to university
but instead attended vocational
school, earning his law degree at night.
His politics were not ideological but
coolly calculating and power-oriented.
The four times married Schroeder had a
reputation for changing political positions
as often as he changed wives. The
U.S.-German relationship might have
been doomed from the beginning had it
not been for the terrorist attacks of September
11 2001 and the ensuing outpouring
of international support for the
United States, not least in Germany.
Schroeder, like much of the rest of
the world, watched the horrifying images
on television and shortly afterward held
a press conference to declare the “unlimited
solidarity”of his government. The
German people responded with an outpouring
of grief and sympathy. More
than a million gathered at the Brandenburg
Gate to show their support for
America. Schroeder visited Ground Zero
in New York and met Bush in Washington
for a joint press conference. The relationship
had been patched up. Bush
declared that “there was no more steadfast
friend in the fight against terrorism”
than Germany.
Schroeder put his government’s future
on the line, forcing a vote of confidence
over German military support for
the war in Afghanistan. By a very slim
majority, and despite the skepticism of
much of the German public, he won
support to deploy more than 2,500
ground forces. This was the high point of
a relationship between Berlin and Washington
that would soon head south.
Sifting through the tea leaves of the
failed relationship, the maneuvering over
who would play what role in the war
against al Qaeda, the conduct of the
Afghanistan war and the run-up to Iraq,
Szabo produces what is almost a primer
on how not to conduct diplomacy. The
Bush Administration mistrusted Germany,
kept it out of the loop and failed
to consult it. Schroeder wanted a place at
the table, but waffled on his commitments
and failed to heed the advice of
his experienced foreign policy team. The
end result was combustible.
In the showdown over Iraq, an embittered
Schroeder, complaining of broken
American promises and finding
himself in deep political trouble at
home, turned his back on the Bush Administration.
Faltering in his bid for reelection,
with his party trailing badly in
the polls, he needed an issue. Suddenly
he had two: deadly floods in eastern Germany
and the war in Iraq. Acting out of
frustration and opportunism, he pulled
Russia into an anti-war coalition with
France and Germany. He survived the
election partly, perhaps largely, by appealing
to a deep streak of anti-Americanism
in the German electorate. Bush
felt he had been stabbed in the back and
took it personally.
Now, with the same leaders still in
office, what are the future prospects for
U.S.-German relations? Although some
strongly believe that a change at the top
would return relations to normal, Szabo
is not among them. He argues persuasively
that permanent damage has been
done, citing opinion polls that portray
Germans as despising U.S. militarism
and believing that America has lost
much of its moral authority to lead.
Without a concerted effort by the United
States to treat a unifying Europe as an
equal partner, there is real danger that
these two powers will pursue different
strategic agendas, further upsetting the
geopolitical balance on a host of international
issues. That would be a tragedy
because, whether or not everyone in
Washington knows it, Europe still does
matter to America.
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