European Affairs
c/o The European Institute
1001 Connecticut Avenue
NW, Suite 220
Washington, DC
20036-5531
Tel: (202) 895-1670
Fax (202) 362-1088
info@europeanaffairs.org
|
|
|
|
|
|
The European Union continues to
take the lead in ongoing diplomatic efforts
to shut down Iran’s nuclear program.
Although a ubiquitous and effective
diplomatic arbiter throughout its
own neighborhood, the EU’s leading role
in negotiations with Iran is unusual; in
the Middle East and beyond, Europe
usually follows America’s lead. Moreover,
the EU-3 (Britain, France, and Germany),
with the help of Europe’s foreign
policy czar, Javier Solana, have maintained
a united front on this challenge.
Consistently since 2003, the EU-3 have
managed to work ever more closely together,
even though they were initially
cold shouldered by Washington and then
had to play a diplomatic chess game during
difficult negotiations with Tehran,
matching Iranian overtures and concessions
and sudden assertiveness with
their own ability to wield carrots and
sticks. Throughout, the EU-3 have maintained
uncharacteristic unity and steadiness
in grappling with this major international
confrontation.
Why has Europe been able to pull
together this sustained and cohesive approach?
The Iraq war, in early 2003, had
made a hash of Europe’s ambitions for a
common foreign policy, opening an
intra-European divide at a moment
when re-nationalization of political life
was already discernible across Europe.
So the stage hardly seemed set for an effective
assertion of the EU’s diplomatic
muscle in the Middle East. How, then, to
explain the EU-3’s determination and
staying power in confronting a belligerent
and shrewd leadership in Tehran?
Two important factors shaped the
diplomatic playing field. First, Washington’s
refusal to negotiate with Tehran
both made it necessary for the EU-3 to
take the lead on Iran and also enabled
them to do so. Had the United States not
invaded Iraq and instead focused its attention
on containment of Iran, European diplomats would likely have taken a
back seat to their U.S counterparts. But
with Washington preoccupied with the
debacle in Iraq and still refusing to negotiate
with its chief adversaries in the region,
the EU had a window of opportunity
to take the leading role in dealing
with Iran.
Second, the fact that the EU-3, not
the broader union, comprises Europe’s
negotiating team has given EU diplomacy
particular coherence and responsiveness
in this case. A union whose
membership is approaching thirty could
never provide collective leadership on issues
such as Iran – especially in the absence
of the institutional reforms needed
to streamline decision-making. The EU
should already take away the obvious
lesson that a core Europe – or at least ad
hoc contact groups formed on select issues
– is essential if the EU is to make
sustained advances toward a common
foreign policy.
Along with these two considerations,
there is another dominant explanation
for the coherence and unity
demonstrated by the EU-3: the Iraq war
and its divisive consequences for Europe
and the Transatlantic community. In
many respects, the ability of the EU-3 to
rise to the occasion in dealing with Iran
stems from its desire to recover from –
and avoid a repeat of – what happened
over the invasion of Iraq and the geopolitical
turmoil that it has spawned.
The invasion of Iraq led to an open
political divide within the EU, pitting a
pro-war coalition led by Britain against
an anti-war coalition led by France and
Germany. On fundamental questions of
war and peace, the EU’s leading nations
ended up on opposing sides. The quest
for European unity had been dealt a
crippling blow.
The urgent need to restore comity
and cooperation within the EU’s guiding
troika provided an important impetus
behind the EU-3’s efforts on Iran. In the
aftermath of the divide between “old”
and “new” Europe, forging and sustaining
a common voice became of the utmost
importance. Europe’s political future,
not just Iran’s nuclear program, was
on the line. Maintaining a united front
was made all the more important by the
failure of the EU constitution, a grievous
setback to efforts to deepen integration,
particularly on matters of foreign policy.
A similar logic applies at the
Transatlantic level. The rift that opened
over the Iraq war called into question the
integrity of the Atlantic alliance. At least
at the outset, that was precisely the objective: France’s President Jacques Chirac
and Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder were ready to contemplate life
afer Pax Americana and expedite the
onset of a multi-polar world.
But that vision proved more attractive
in principle than in reality. The majority
of EU member states preferred to
maintain the Transatlantic link and extend
America’s role as Europe’s strategic
guarantor. Moreover, those EU members
that opposed the war were left with little
leverage over U.S. policy, effectively relegating
them to the diplomatic sidelines.
Chirac and Schröder, although they enjoyed
an initial boost in popularity for
standing up to Washington, soon saw
their political fortunes and their diplomatic
influence lag.
The consequent desire to rebuild
Transatlantic harmony played into the
determination of the EU-3 to stand together
and tough on Iran. To win back
Washington’s respect, France and Germany
needed to demonstrate that they
had the wherewithal to confront Tehran.
In response to European objections to
toppling Saddam Hussein, the neo-conservatives
had accused Paris and Berlin
of appeasement. Both capitals were determined
to show that Iraq was a unique
case: on Iran, they understood the importance
of coercive diplomacy.
In addition, the EU-3 were intent on
demonstrating that they could be more
than spoilers. On Iraq, Washington justifiably criticized Europe for telling the
U.S. what not to do without offering proactive
policy alternatives. On Iran, Europeans
were determined to take the offense,
making clear that they had the
political will to take the diplomatic initiative.
The gambit paid off. Soon after
Bush’s reelection in 2004, the administration
agreed to get behind European
diplomacy on Iran, calculating that the
EU had a sensible game plan and intended
to stand its ground against
Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.
One other factor appears to have
strengthened European resolve, particularly
in Germany. President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad is known for his inflammatory
rhetoric, especially when it
comes to his calls for the destruction of
Israel and his denial of the Holocaust.
Such behavior provokes moral outrage in
Germany, whose own past makes the
country particularly sensitive to Ahmadinejad’s
anti-Semitic outbursts. Public
outrage has strengthened the ability
of the German government to maintain
a hard line on Iran policy.
With the EU-3 in the lead, a Transatlantic
consensus on Iran has been sustained
for the past two years. To be sure,
maintaining that consensus has required
compromise, with Washington having
deferred to Europe’s repeated willingness
to let deadlines pass without pressing for
sanctions. America’s preoccupation in
Iraq and Transatlantic concern about
Russian and Chinese objections to sanctions
have played important roles in inducing flexibility in U.S. policy. And European
governments have proved much
tougher than Washington expected in
their determination to keep up the pressure
on Tehran over transparency and
the tricky core issues such as the right
claimed by Iran to have a national program
of uranium enrichment.
It is by no means clear whether a
Transatlantic or European consensus can
be sustained if Iranian intransigence
continues and triggers a move to impose
sanctions. Should the negotiations move
out of the United Nations arena in order
to circumvent Russian and Chinese vetoes,
it will be far more difficult to sustain
European unity. Should the sanctions
tighten and the likelihood of
military intervention mount, a new
transatlantic rift would be hard to avoid.
On the other hand, a negotiated settlement
to the crisis would certainly help
repair the transatlantic link and give a
much-needed boost to Europe’s efforts to
assume greater geopolitical responsibilities
in an effective and unified manner.
Iran is likely to continue its efforts to foil
this outcome, consistently looking to
drive a wedge between Europe and the
United States. Maintaining a unified
front in the face of such pressure offers
the best hope of convincing Tehran to
seek a diplomatic resolution, thereby
avoiding another Transatlantic confrontation
that could be even more divisive
than the rift over Iraq.
|
|
|
|
