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Who exactly was it that sounded the
alarm about nuclear subterfuge threat in
Iran and the possibility that Tehran
might be trying to build nuclear
weapons? It remains a slightly open
question. France’s President Jacques
Chirac or Foreign Minister Dominique
de Villepin? Or was it Joschka Fischer,
Germany’s top diplomat at the time?
What is known is that reactions crystallized
in Europe, in May 2003, when
Chirac sounded the alarm at an international
conference on drugs in Paris.
Washington had already been
alerted to the problem thanks to information
passed along by Iranian dissidents
(initially the People’s Mujahedin)
about centrifuges set up at secret sites in
Iran and not reported to the International
Atomic Energy Agency. But the
Bush administration had its hands full
with Iraq and European officials were
worried that Washington was not paying
enough attention to the Iranian dossier.
So they decided that it was time for Europe
to take on the problem. To put it
bluntly, some European diplomats explain
privately, they felt compelled to
take action fast because they were worried
about what Washington might do
otherwise. They feared the Bush administration
might suddenly ‘wake up’ to the
problem and react militarily with an intervention
that most Europeans saw as
disastrous.
Now negotiations with the Iranians
have gone on for three years, marked by
repeated setbacks and some temporary
breakthroughs. But at the end of 2006,
the talks appear to have reached a dead
end: the Iranians refuse to comply with
the international community’s demand
that they suspend uranium enrichment
in their country.
Have the Europeans spent three
years working on the issue for nothing?
If that proves to be the case, it would be a
setback for them, not only on the substance but also because their Iranian initiative
was an attempt to put into practice
the common defense and security
policy that they have been striving to set
up for years. It also represents an attempt
to succeed geopolitically with the soft
power approach that the Europeans are
quick to promote as an alternative to the
hard power that Washington prides itself
on wielding.
The so-called “E-3” approach –
bringing together France, Germany and
Great Britain as a team – is an innovation
in European collective policy-making.
At first glance, it seems to be a natural
format, bringing together the three
countries that are, economically and/or
diplomatically, the three most influential
member states of the European Union.
But this E-3 trio was not the “troika” that
Mr. Chirac originally had in mind when
he started planning a “European” approach
to the Iranian nuclear dossier.
His initial idea, in summer 2003, was to
use the same tripartite French-German-
Russian front that worked together a few
months earlier in opposing the U.S.-led
war in Iraq; he had approached both
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The Russians declined to go along: they
have never offered an explanation of
their reasoning, but their motives could
include both a wish to avoid aggravating
tensions with Washington and a desire to
protect Moscow’s military and economic
ties with Tehran.
With the Russians out, France and
Germany turned to Britain. The three
countries’ foreign ministers – de Villepin,
Fischer and Jack Straw – arrived together
in Tehran on October 21, 2003. They
met with Hassan Rohani, the representative
of Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khameini, on the Supreme National Security
Council (SNSC), and reached an
agreement with him. The deal proved
short-lived, but it marked the birth of
the “E-3” – which only became the “EU-
3” a few months later when the joint effort
expanded to include Javier Solana,
the High Representative of the European
Council, who is “Mr. EU foreign-and security-policy.”
This team has stayed intact through
the ups and downs of the confrontation
with Iran, and its success raises a question:
How did these three countries (and
the EU) unite on the Iranian issue in a
way that contrasts so sharply with the
way they split so openly (among themselves
and with the United States) over
Iraq only a few months earlier? When
the question is phrased that way, it almost
answers itself: It was precisely because
they had clashed so badly in the
Iraq crisis that these three European
governments needed a cause around
which they could cooperate and achieve
a degree of reconciliation.
While not seeing eye-to-eye on European
integration, all three of these
countries realize that, when they are divided,
Europe’s nations do not count
heavily in international affairs. Even if he
does not publicly acknowledge it, Tony
Blair knows perfectly well that his close
ties with George W. Bush have not given
him any influence on U.S. policy. In the
run-up to the Iraq war, Paris and London
pursued diametrically opposed policies
– with France resisting the U.S. plan
and Britain supporting Washington.
Both failed. France was unable to prevent
the war. Britain was unable to wean
U.S. policy away from American unilateralism.
So it was logical to conclude
that by joining forces instead of fighting
each other, the leading EU states might
be able to use the Iranian nuclear issue
to prove that Europe could come up with
an effective alternative to the forceful
tactics advocated by the Bush administration.
Along with this general consensus
about the need to show European unity,
there were other factors at work in each
capital. In London, Jack Straw comes
from a British Socialist background that
traditionally has been pacifist and not
pro-European; but if “Europe” can help
resolve a crisis by negotiation instead of
by military force, he is all for it. And
Britain, generally speaking, has always
wanted to be part of any and all European
undertakings that seem likely to
succeed. German motives were different.
Germany has major economic interests
in Iran. And after having said no to
Washington over Iraq, Berlin wanted to
do whatever it could to avoid being put
in the position of having to make that
choice again. And Germany always
wishes to support anything that seems
likely to strengthen European integration.
Italy also has interests at stake in
Iran, but refused initially to take part in
the group on the grounds that it did not
want to see “factional activities” in the
EU. The Italians subsequently changed
their mind and wanted to join the E-3
initiative, but they were rebuffed.
France was influenced by its longstanding
concern about the risks of nuclear
proliferation. This French preoccupation
often comes as a surprise to
outsiders because France has often set a
bad example – i.e., when Chirac resumed
nuclear testing in 1995, a year when the
world was observing the 50th anniversary
of Hiroshima. But France has been
very active in opposing efforts by other
countries to develop the bomb.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
limits the number of nuclear-weapons
states to a club of five, including France:
France wants to protect its status, and it
has the expertise about nuclear arms to
be a vigilant watchdog against attempts
to spread this weapons technology. On
top of these strategic reasons, there are
some personal considerations guiding
French policy. Chirac is deeply suspicious
of the Iranian regime – an attitude
that dates back to the 1980s, just after the
Iranian revolution. As mayor of Paris
and then as prime minister for two years,
Chirac had to grapple with Iranian backed
terrorism in the French capital.
He views Shi’a Muslims as prone to fanaticism
and has warned George W.
Bush about Iran, saying in effect “there
are no hardliners, no moderates: they are
all the same.”
The E-3 group is an example of “enhanced
cooperation” in foreign policy –
a mechanism that enables a few member
states to act together in the name of the
entire EU of 25 member states. In this
case, the proper institutional procedures
were not fully implemented at the outset,
and so the E-3 only became the “EU-3”
when Solana was asked to come on
board. His office has a responsibility to
keep the trio aware of the thinking
among the rest of the 25 member states –
most of which are inclined to take a
softer line with Tehran – and to inform
the other 22 about what positions the
EU-3 take. This has not always been an
easy task because Paris, London and
Berlin have not been on the same page at
every step of the way.
And yet the troika has worked. It
speaks, by proxy, in the name of the 25-
member EU. It fills in for the United
States at moments when Washington is
not engaging fully on the issue. In fact,
the Europeans got involved in the first
place largely because the Bush administration
had its hands full with Iraq and
was not particularly ready to tackle the
Iranian issue. Moreover, Washington did
not have a clear idea about how to tackle
the nuclear issue; it did not even know
how it could negotiate with a government
with which it has no official contacts;
and it did not want to open a third
military front in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan.
These reasons explain why
the Europeans got involved and why the
Americans were ready to let them do so.
At the outset, Washington kept a skeptical
eye on the Europeans’ negotiations
with Tehran, without offering any encouragement
or help – but also without
doing anything to derail the European
initiative. In the U.S. view, it could only
be good news if the Europeans succeeded;
if they failed, it would be further
proof that soft power cannot do the job.
It would provide a come-uppance for
sermonizing Europeans, starting with
that Dominique de Villepin, the French
foreign minister who had “put a knife in
the back’’ of Secretary of State Colin
Powell at the UN in February 2003.
The inclusion of Britain in the troika
provided a guarantee that it would not
do anything contrary to U.S. interests.
Indeed, the three European governments
were careful to keep the Bush administration
constantly apprised about each
step in the negotiations with Tehran. The
U.S. attitude took a more positive turn
after Bush’s re-election when Condelezza
Rice took over the State Department and
set about mending fences with the European
allies, particularly with “old Europe,”
essentially the French-German
axis descried by the first Bush administration.
The Bush trip to Europe in February
2005 firmed up Transatlantic cooperation
on this issue.
From then on, the EU-3 and Solana
have managed to maintain a fine diplomatic
balance. On the one hand, the Europeans took a tough enough line with
Iran to maintain American confidence
and support, essentially by sticking to
the Western position that Tehran must
suspend its uranium enrichment activities
before Europe can move to deliver
on its promised incentives. But at the
same time, the Europeans showed willingness
to negotiate with Tehran – an attitude
that kept the Russians and Chinese
from breaking ranks about the
threat of sanctions against Iran, which
both Moscow and Beijing are clearly reluctant
to impose.
This “united international community”
– which Europeans are justly proud
of – may be on the point of crumbling, for
several reasons. There is a limit to how
long this alignment (which can be described
as the five permanent members of
the Security Council plus Germany or as
the EU-3 plus the U.S., Russia and China)
can continue. After the decision in December
to impose sanctions, it is unclear
how long this team can put off deciding
whether and how far to impose additional
sanctions if the showdown continues to
escalate. Increasingly, Europeans seem to
be tempted to adopt a more passive line
because they are afraid of what Hezbollah
might do in Lebanon under orders from
Iran (and Syria) as reprisals for sanctions.
Chirac, who was one of the most determined
leaders in seeking to scotch the
risk of nuclear proliferation, is now looking
for a way out that avoids tougher
sanctions on Iran. The United States may
have to make more compromises, too, if it
decides that it has to start talking to
Tehran and Damascus to get their help in
stabilizing the situation in Iraq. Washington
may have to pay a price for support in
Iraq, by concessions to Syria about
Lebanon and over the nuclear issue to
Iran. Regardless of whether they want to
use hard power or soft, Western governments
find that they are not holding the
trump cards in this situation.
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