Spaniards against Germans, French against Italians, Poles against Italians,
even Luxembourgers against Indians! Cross-border hostile takeover bids trigger
nationalistic reflexes in a trend squarely at odds with the European Union’s
principles of a single market and, more recently, the Lisbon Agenda for improved
competitiveness.
Two years after the historic EU enlargement to 25 member nations, the state of
the union seems more fragile than ever. A new wave of protectionism is rising
with governments at the ready to defend their corporate “national champions”
against takeovers by foreign rivals, even from fellow-EU countries. This trend,
which emerged in the wake of the rejection of the proposed EU constitutional
treaty by French and Dutch voters, seems to have paralyzed European politicians.
There are calls to suspend or even stop further enlargement as well as proposals
to drop the constitution and forget about further integration. Such second
thoughts are voiced by members of the European Parliament, leading politicians
and experts in member states.
In principle, all politicians and economic leaders within the EU 25 agree that
the single market with its “four freedoms” (the free movement of goods, capital,
labor and services) is a good thing and should be strengthened by all means. And
the European Commission, under President Jose Manuel Barroso, continues to
pursue the Lisbon Agenda with a stiff upper lip. But in practice, principles
tend to vanish quickly in times of low growth, high unemployment and nagging
fears of globalization.
At election time, when frustrated voters are demanding protection from
international competitive pressures and threatening to kick out the governing
party or coalition, principles are sacrificed. This process was on view early
this year with the controversial “Services Directive” that was intended to
establish the single market in services. Despite the fact that fast-growing
services already are generating 70 percent of the EU’s gross domestic product,
the proposed reform sparked an emotional debate. The result was a weak
compromise that was especially unsatisfactory for the new EU members.
Hostility to the plan rested on the belief that the directive would result in
cheap workers from the new, poorer countries of the EU undercutting wellpaid and
well-protected jobs in the service sectors in richer older member states. The
negative image of the “Polish plumber,” who became a symbol of cheap labor and a
nuisance in the constitutional referendum debates, captured everything that went
wrong within the badlyhandled debate on the services directive.
The perceived or imagined threat of cross-border migration was not new: in
mid-2004 Germany and Austria had announced that they intended to keep their
borders closed to workers from the ten new EU member states. But this year the
trend amplified into a groundswell of nationalistic emotions in the existing
member states, running totally against the promise of the single market with its
four pillars of free movement. The force of this wave caught the Commission by
surprise – and laid the groundwork for worse shocks to come.
These erupted after the explosion of oil and gas prices. Amid mounting concern
about security of energy supplies, the theme of “economic patriotism” – coined
in France by Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin and taken up, with or without
copyright acknowledgement, by many European leaders – came to the fore and the
belief gained ground that only the creation of huge domestic companies –
national champions – could guarantee energy availability and serve as a
country’s protective barrier against the harsh winds of foreign competition and
antagonistic economic power.
“Economic patriotism” gave rise to the
creation of national champions to ward off foreign competition
The idea that the European Union as a whole and its single market could provide
the critical mass necessary to protect the supply of strategic goods and should
be looked upon as the answer to the challenges of globalization apparently did
not occur to the worried politicians. “Our defensive move to keep the German
energy company E.ON from taking over the Spanish energy distributor Endesa has
nothing to do with protectionism but everything to do with energy security,”
said Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the prime minister of Spain. His energy
minister was even more direct: “All states have the right to have big utilities,
why not Spain?” True to its convictions, the Spanish government increased the
powers of the national energy regulatory authority over mergers and acquisitions
in order to keep E.ON out. At the same time it encouraged the Spanish company,
Gas Natural, to bid for Endesa, thus preparing the ground for a national
champion in the energy field.
In the same spirit, France prevented the Italian energy company Enel from taking
over the French-Belgian utility, Suez, by engineering an instant merger of Suez
with the state-owned utility, Gaz de France. After fending off a foreign (Swiss)
bid for pharmaceutical giant Aventis, France announced plans to fence off ten
strategic sectors (including some food products) from foreign takeovers. That
idea has not been tested as a possible violation of EU law on the free movement
of capital.
A wave of new protectionism could aggravate economic woes in Europe
In the case of Poland, the new populist government vehemently opposed UniCredit,
an Italian bank, when it wanted to merge its two Polish subsidiaries, BPH and
Pekao – in effect, a takeover of BPH through the bank’s earlier acquisition of
Pekao. For the Polish government this meant too much foreign influence over the
national financial markets. As one Polish politician was quoted saying, “If you
do not want our Polish plumber, we do not want your Italian banker.”
Most astonishing and revealing, however, was the sudden change of heart of
Luxembourg’s Prime Minister, Jean Claude Juncker, long one of the most ardent
advocates of free trade and market liberalization. He quickly cast off these old
credentials when faced with a takeover threat on Arcelor, the French- Spanish-Luxembourger
steel company, by India’s Mittal Steel, owned by the industrial mogul, Lakshmi
Mittal. The fear of losing a flagship company and thousands of jobs in the small
Duchy of Luxembourg was too much for even such a convinced free-trader as
Juncker. Despite his record as a reliable and very successful global investor,
who has turned supposedly hopeless steel producers in Eastern Europe and
elsewhere into successful companies, Mittal was given an entirely unwelcome
reception and every effort was made to torpedo his plan for merger with Arcelor.
Interestingly, the same politicians, who at home are frantically erecting
barriers around self-declared strategic sectors, become adamant supporters of
European competitiveness and the single market when they are in Brussels. At the
March EU Summit, all 25 heads of state unanimously agreed to work for a more
competitive Europe in the framework of the new enhanced Lisbon Agenda and to
extend the single market into such strategic sectors as energy. None of the
leaders assembled there had the courage to speak out against the protectionist
tendencies in some member states that are undermining the four pillars of the
single market they ostensibly champion.
When the EU finance ministers later met in Vienna, they similarly overlooked
these worrying developments. They talked rather generally about “a wave of new
protectionism” that could aggravate economic woes in Europe. But there was no
public mention of specific wrongdoing. A bit more forthright, Jean-Claude
Trichet, head of the European Central Bank, warned that protectionism always
carried a risk for growth; and Axel Weber, president of Germany’s Bundesbank,
added that welfare deficits invariably worsened in countries trying to protect
their companies from competitive forces.
Joaquin Almunia, the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, however did
not mince words. Refreshingly direct, he complained that the Europe of Jean
Monnet is looking increasingly like the Europe of Colbert. The latter served as
France’s finance minister under King Louis XIV and is considered to be the
father of mercantilism. “Going back to the principles of the 17th century is
hardly progress,” said Almunia. He reminded errant European leaders – whom he
described as “self-proclaimed defenders of national interests” – that life
behind protective walls is deceivingly cozy and ultimately doomed. “Behind the
Maginot Line the French troops felt save and secure until the Germans overran
their defensive wall,” he warned.
Despite these discouraging signs in EU countries, there are reasons to remain
confident that this protectionism is a phase, not a specific and necessarily
enduring European phenomenon. In fact, we have been here before, we can see a
similar phase in the United States and, beyond the controversial cases that make
headlines, there is real overall progress against protectionism. Probably the
most convincing proof that the notion of “Fortress Europe” does not reflect
reality is the fast growth of imports in most of the 25 member states. China is
the main source of these imports, even though Brussels has occasionally resorted
to protectionist measures to stem the rising tide of Chinese goods. After years
of double digit export growth China is about to overtake the United States as
Europe’s largest supplier of merchandise in 2006.
On the first point, veteran EU observers have seen all these developments
before. It is by no means the first time that governments have tried to create
national champions and to intervene to keep foreigners out. The French may be
the biggest offenders in this regard, but even the economically liberal Germans
are sometimes guilty of trying to protect their companies from hostile foreign
takeovers. A case in point is the carmaker, Volkswagen. Its ownership includes a
golden share held by the German state of Lower Saxony, where VW is by far the
largest local employer. This holding is a formidable protective wall for the
company.
There are reasons to remain confident that this protectionism is a phase,
not a specific and necessarily enduring European phenomenon
When it comes to foreign capital, Europeans have always tended to speak with two
tongues. Foreign direct investment, which creates productive capacity and
well-paid jobs, is welcome everywhere; but foreign takeovers of a nation’s big
high-profile companies, usually accompanied by cost-cutting and job losses, are
frowned upon. At the same time, French, German and other European companies are
themselves happily gobbling up companies abroad and are being actively supported
by their governments in that strategy, using their government- defended domestic
base to expand into more open markets.
Of course, the backlash against crossborder takeovers is hardly confined to
Europe. The U.S. Congress recently blocked Dubai Ports World from purchasing a
British-owned company operating six American sea ports. Fear of terrorism might
explain this newest bout of economic patriotism. But when Congress stopped a bid
for the oil company, Unocal, by a state-owned Chinese oil company, U.S.
objections had more to do with economic rivalry and fears about China’s
expanding role and influence in global commerce than fear of terrorism.
Subsequently, the United States has permitted Dubai International Capital to buy
Doncasters Group, which makes parts for American weapons. Congress is debating
the creation of a new office to attract foreign investment to the U.S. to be
called the Untied States Direct Investment Administration after lobbying by
business.
The United States Is Wary of Takeovers from China, Not Europe
The hostile U.S. response to the proposed port takeover by Dubai World Ports
highlighted a new hurdle for foreign direct investment in the United States: the
perceived risk to U.S. national security. This concern came into focus during
the 1980s amid particular alarm that Japan might secure key U.S. technologies
and monopolize their commercial payoff. In 1998, Congress ordered that this
“security” factor be taken into consideration by the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), the inter-agency body that reviews
proposed acquisitions by foreign investors for the U.S. president (and which
approved the Dubai deal before the president reversed course under political
pressure). As that case showed, political potency has been injected into issue
by mounting public concern about terrorist threats in the United States. This
translates into a new U.S. policy of protecting “critical infrastructure” as a
criterion in every CFIUS review.
This new factor in the U.S. climate for foreign investment is well analyzed in a
new study published by the Institute for International Economics, a thinktank in
Washington. Entitled US National Security and Foreign Direct Investment, the
book by two former U.S. officials makes the point that the role of CFIUS is not
to block politically unpopular transactions or to protect uncompetitive American
businesses. But it shows that security concerns have made CFIUS increasingly
intrusive and restrictive in examining bids in the defense and
telecommunications sectors – with more still-undefined areas likely to get this
closer scrutiny.
A main conclusion of the IIE study is that China – not European and other Asian
countries – is currently the main foreign nation that causes alarm in the United
States with bids for U.S. companies. Economic tensions with China are always in
the background of such discussions, but the U.S. attitude also reflects
political concerns, including some high-profile breaches of U.S. laws on
handling of U.S. technology by Chinese companies. “Of the United States’ ten
largest trading partners, China is the only one not considered a strategic or
political ally,” the authors write. As demonstrated in the recent case when the
Chinese firm CNOOC was blocked when it attempted to acquire a U.S. oil company,
opposition crystallizes more easily when the prospective new owner is a
state-owned entity. In China, the study says, only about 20 percent of the
country’s 1,300 publicly listed companies in 2004 were genuinely private; the
rest were all ultimately controlled by the state.
There is a substantial tradition of opposition to foreign takeovers in the
hearts and minds of American lawmakers. In the late 1980s, Japanese investors
faced political and public hostility over their U.S. acquisitions. Moreover,
tough legal restrictions regarding foreign equity participations in the energy,
media, communications and airline businesses date back a long time and make
foreign takeovers just about impossible in these sectors.
The Department of Homeland Security has designated 12 sectors of the U.S.
economy as “critical infrastructure,” a category where foreign ownership is
liable to face increasing restrictions. This new list now includes additional
sectors such as food manufacturing, chemicals, computers and electronics, and
water and road transport. In contrast, prospects seem good for a pending deal
that seems to have been well managed – the takeover of the telecom giant,
Lucent, including its defense business, by France’s Alcatel. As a new test case,
it could provide a more encouraging precedent for the openness of the U.S.
economy.
In this context one needs to mention as well the “Buy America Act” which dates
back to the time of the Depression and has resisted repeal ever since. Passed in
1933 the act mandates preferences for the purchase of domestically-produced
goods over foreign goods in U.S. government procurement. Critics have always
labeled this piece of legislation and its subsequent modifications as one of the
most visible and egregious remnants of U.S. protectionism. Moreover, it has been
frequently cited as justification for other countries to institute their own
domestic-content requirements in order to protect their companies and workers
against foreign competitors.
The new generation of European managers will not be browbeaten by
politicians, but will insist on following their own strategic plans
Thirdly, the current bout of “economic patriotism” comes on top of an
unprecedented merger wave, including cross-border takeovers that have
strengthened the EU single market. In this bigger picture, the protectionist
moves by some politicians are being overwhelmed by the self-confidence of
corporate Europe. Its coffers are full and its ambitions run high in seeking to
put together blue-chip European companies big and strong enough to withstand the
ever-increasing global competition. The new generation of European managers will
not be browbeaten by politicians: they will stand up to them and insist on
following their own strategic plans.
Even with these glimmers of hope, the protectionist developments are worrying
symptoms of a process that could get worse. Once rules about open markets are
broken, more trespassing might follow, slowly but surely eroding the benefits of
the single market. In fact, the single market remains weak and incomplete: this
spring the Commission issued more than 37 letters to 17 governments complaining
about failures to implement single-market rules. Last year the number of such
violations within the 15 old member states rose to 1068 from 1009 in the
previous year.
The Commission’s powers – notices, public scolding and ultimately lawsuits – are
blunt weapons that take a long time to be effective, with no guarantee of
success. In the end, the best weapon in the fight against protectionism is
political pressure, which has to come from the willingness of member states to
back up the Commission on this issue. At this point, one must cross one’s
fingers in hope that a majority of member states will stand behind the
Commission. It is the best chance of foiling protectionist moves by a few member
states. It is an obligation of members individually to the European Union as a
whole.
Carola Kaps worked for 25 years as an economic correspondent for the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, covering the United States, Africa, Eastern
Europe and Brussels. She continues to write in the FAZ and other publications,
mainly about central Europe and the Balkans.
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